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Petitioner was disbarred in 1938 under a statutory provision providing
for disbarment of an attorney who commits any infamous crime or misde-
meanor involving moral turpitude.' The disbarment decree ordered that the
petitioner be permanently disbarred, his name permanently stricken from the
roll of attorneys and that he be "forever enjoined and prohibited from engaging
in... the practice of law ... in the State of Tennessee." Petitioner applied
for reinstatement to the chancery court which had disbarred him. Respondents
demurred to the petition on thd grounds that the disbarment decree constituted
a permanent disability and rendered petitioner forever ineligible for read-
mission to the bar, or, in the alternative, that the decree "at least completely
deprived petitioner of the office of an attorney and left him a layman who must
pursue the avenue presently provided for new applicants in order to re-enter
the profession." From a decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the
petition, petitioner appealed. Held, affirmed. An attorney disbarred for the
commission of an infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude
may be readmitted to the bar, but he must seek readmission through the Board
of Law Examiners. Cantor v. Grievance Committees of Washington and
Carter County Bar Ass'ns, 226 S.W.2d 283 (Tenn. 1949).
It seems to be well settled that disbarment is not necessarily permanent,
even though the disbarment decree is couched in terms of permanency,2 al-
L. "Any attorney . . . admitted to practice in the courts of the state may be dis-
barred or suspended from the practice of law-(1) Who shall commit or may have com-
mitted, any infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude." TENN. CODE
ANN. § 9974 (Williams 1934). [Subdivisions (2), (3), (4) and (5) provide for dis-
barment or suspension for other reasons].
"In cases arising under the first subdivision of the preceding section, the judgment
of the court must be that the name of the attorney shall be stricken from the roll of
attorneys,... and that he be excluded from practicing ... in all the courts of the state;
and, upon conviction, in cases under other subdivisions of the preceding section, the
judgment shall be permanent or temporary deprivation of the right to practice law, or
a censure or reprimand, according to the gravity of the offense." TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 9975 (Williams 1934).
2. In re Boone, 90 Fed. 793 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898); Wettlin v. State Bar, 24 Cal.
2d 862, 151 P.2d 255 (1944); It re Stump, 272 Ky. 593, 114 S.W.2d 1094 (1938);
Ex parte Redmond, 120 Miss. 536, 82 So. 513 (1919) ; 5 Am . JuR., Attorncys at Law
§ 301 (1936); 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client § 41 (1937); WEEKS, ATTORNEY AND
CLIENT § 82 (1878). Thus in It re Boone, supra, an order perpetually disbarring an
attorney was held not to preclude reinstatement; and in Ex parte Redmond, supra, the
court held that a statute providing that after an attorney is disbarred "such person
shall never afterward be permitted to act as an attorney or counselor in any court in
this state" meant only so long as the judgment remained unchanged, and that the court
could reopen the case and reinstate the lawyer.
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though the language in a few cases indicates that ihe seriousness of the offense
may be so great as to warrant forever barring the offender from the practice
of law.3 Where a statute prohibits the admission to practice of any person
convicted of certain crimes,4 it would seem that one disbarred for such a
conviction would be forever ineligible for readmission. 5 In the absence of such
statutes the courts, stressing their interest in the regeneration of erring at-
torneys, have held that a disbarred attorney might be reinstated in proper
instances. Disbarment "is not properly or technically to be considered as in
the nature of punishment, though it may have that practical effect. Its purpose
is to exclude from the office of an attorney in the courts, for the preservation
of the purity of the courts and the protection of the public, one who has
demonstrated that he is not a proper person to hold such office." 6 Therefore,
when an attorney can satisfy the court that he has regained that high ethical
standard requisite of members of the legal profession, he should be reinstated.7
The court in the instant case distinguished between attorneys disbarred
for the commission of a crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, and
those disbarred for other reasons, holding that the former must seek readmis-
sion through the Board of Law Examiners, while the latter have a right to
seek reinstatement by petition to the court which disbarred -them. This dis-
tinction seems not to have been previously made."
A majority of the courts hold that a disbarred attorney, seeking reinstate-
ment, must apply to the court which disbarred him.9 The disbarring court is
said to have continuing jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties, 1°
3. See In re Keenan, 314 Mass. 544, 50 N.E.2d 785, 788 (1943); Bar Ass'n of
Boston v. Greenhood, 168 Mass. 169, 183, 46 N.E. 568 (1897-).
4. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 30.100 (1943) (felony); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. Ax.
art. 311 (1947) (felony). GA. CODE Am. § 9-501 (1936) requires disbarment of an
attorney convicted of crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and § 9-519 pro-
hibits such attorney's reinstatement. As to constitutionality of statutes regulating admis-
sion to the bar, see Notes, 66 A.L.R. 1512 (1930), 81 A.L.R. 1064 (1932).
5. See In re Stump, 272 Ky. 593, 114 S.W.2d 1094, 1098 (1938).
6. In re Keenan, 310 Mass 166, 37 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1941) ; 2 THORNTON, ATTOR-
NEYS AT LAW § 762 (1914).
7. E.g., it re Boone, 90 Fed. 793 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1898); Wettlin v. State Bar,
24 Cal. 2d 862, 151 P.2d 255 (1944); In re Salsbury, 217 Mich. 260, 186 N.W. 404
(1922) ; It re Simpson, 11 N.D. 526, 93 N.W. 918 (1903).
8. In Ex parte Mitchell, 123 W. Va. 282, 14 S.E2d 771 (1941), the court drew a
distinction between statutory annulment of a license to practice law and common law
disbarment, holding that by the former an attorney was relegated to the position of a
layman,-his license becoming totally void and incapable of subsequent revitalization. In
order to practice law again the attorney must obtain a new license. But in the case of
common law disbarment, the disbarring court retains jurisdiction and may terminate
the disbarment at any time. In the instant case, both reasons for disbarment are
statutory. Cf. In re Jacobsen, 209 Cal. 539, 289 Pac. 159 (1930) ; In re H- S-, 236
Mo. App. 1296, 165 S.W.2d 300 (1942).
9. E.g., In re Talbott, 58 Ind. App. 426, 108 N.E. 240 (1915) ; In re King, 54 Ohio
St. 415, 43 N.E. 686 (1896) ; In re Margolis, 280 Pa. 296, 124 Atl. 439 (1924) ; Burns v.
State, 129 Tex. 303, 103 S.W.2d 960 (1937), reversing 76 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934); 2 THORNTON, ATTORNEYS AT LAW § 902 (1914); 5 Am. JUR., Attorneys at Law
§ 301 (1936); 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client § 41 (1937).
10. In re King, 54 Ohio St. 415, 43 N.E. 686 (1896); Burns v. State, 129 Tex. 303,
103 S.W.2d 960 (1937), reversing 76 S.W2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
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and to have the inherent pover to reinstate those whom it disbars." Other
courts have held that the petition for reinstatement must be treated as an ap-
plication for admission and must therefore be addressed to the court having
jurisdiction to admit attorneys to practice.12 But none of these courts hold
that an attorney disbarred for one reason must seek admission in the same
manner as original applicants to practice, while those disbarred for other
reasons must seek reinstatement through the disbarring court.13 The position
of the Tennessee Supreme Court in this respect seems to be unique.'
4
Are not all attorneys, once they are disbarred, their names stricken from
the rolls, and their licenses revoked, in the same position? It would seem that
each has been relegated to the position of a layman, regardless of the reason
for his disbarment, and that each should pursue the same course in seeking
to regain the lost privilege. True, there is a valid distinction between disbar-
ment for the commission of an infamous crime or misdemeanor involving moral
turpitude and disbarment for less serious offenses. But it would seem to be
better either to adopt a uniform rule of procedure for the reinstatement of all
disbarred attorneys, or to forbid entirely the reinstatement of attorneys dis-
barred for those reasons deemed by the court sufficiently serious to warrant
their being distinguished.15 Of these suggested alternatives, the former would
appear to be more desirable.'
6
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE-ESTOPPEL BY JUDGMENT-PRIOR
JUDGMENT AGAINST INSURED AS BAR TO INSURER'S DEFENSE OF LACK
OF COVERAGE
Plaintiff insurance company contracted to "pay on behalf of the insured
all sums which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the
liability imposed upon him by law for damages . . .because of bodily injury
... sustained by any person or persons, caused by accident and arising out
11. People e. rel. Colorado Bar Ass'n v. Essington, 32 Colo. 168, 75 Pac. 394 (1904)
It re Talbott, 58 Ind. App. 426, 108 N.E. 240 (1915) ; Ex parte Redmond, 120 Miss, 536,
82 So. 513 (1919).
12. In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935) ; in re H- S-, 236 Mo.
App. 1296, 165 S.W.2d 300 (1942); In re Fleming, 36 N.M. 93, 8 P.2d 1063 (1932).
But cf. It re Stevens, 197 Cal. 408, 241 Pac. 88 (1925).
13. See note 8 supra.
14. The state code does not make this distinction. It merely provides that an attorney
must be disbarred when he has been guilty of a specified offense, while for other offenses
he may or may not be disbarred, the seriousness of the punishment being left to the
discretion of the court. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 9974, 9975 (Williams 1934).
15. See note 4 supra.
16. Assuming that a statute expressly requires those attoneys disbarred for one
reason to seek readmission in the manner provided for original applicants and those
disbarred for all other reasons to seek reinstatement through the court that disbarred
them, quaere, is not this an unwarranted invasion by the legislature of the power of
the Judiciary over its officers? Compare this with the exclusive power of the state legis-
lators and of Congress to determine whether their respective members shall be allowed
to take their seats.
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of the ownership, maintenance or use" of his automobile, and to defend any
suit against the insured alleging such accidental injury. Intentional injuries
were expressly excluded from the coverage of the policy. After an automobile
collision with the insured, the injured parties or their personal representatives
brought suit against him for damages; the insurer appeared to defend that
action, but withdrew with leave of court before the trial., Judgments were
entered against the insured for negligence, upon which execution was re-
turned unsatisfied; by statute,2 the judgment creditors in such circumstances
were entitled to sue the insurer directly upon the judgments so rendered.
Upon the ground that the injury was intentionally caused by the insured, the
insurance company brought the present action for a declaratory judgment
of nonliability, and for an injunction against the institution of an action
against it to collect the judgments. The federal district court held the insurer
estopped to raise the issue, and granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Held (2-1), reversed and remanded; "the policy in suit could not
legally cover and was not intended to cover such conduct as [the insured]
was guilty of.... [T]he binding effect of a judgment against the insured
does not extend to matters outside the scope of the insurance contract." Farm
Bureau. Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, - U.S. - (1950).
Where an indemnitor has notice of and opportunity to defend an action
against his indemnitee, he is bound by material facts established against the
indemnitee, whether he appears in defense of the action or not.2 The con-
clusiveness of the judgment as against the party obligated to make indemnity
extends only to the issues necessarily determined in the prior action; 4 it does
not extend to the question as to whether there is an actual obligation to in-
demnify, unless the facts which determine that matter were necessarily ad-
judicated in the prior action.5 These general principles have frequent appli-
1. The company withdrew from the defense because, in the meantime, the insured
had been convicted of second degree murder for intentionally and maliciously causing
the death of one of the occupants of the other automobile.
2. VA. CODE Axx. § 4326a (1942). For this same provision in the 1950 Code,
see VA. CODE ANN. § 38-238 (1950).
3. E.g., Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 3i6, 16 Sup.
Ct. 564, 40 L. Ed. 712 (1896); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Richmond Guano
Co., 297 Fed. 580 (4th Cir. 1924); Drennan v. Bunn, 124 Ill. 175, 16 N.E. 100,
7 Am. St. Rep. 354 (1888). See 30 Am. JUR., Judgments § 237 (1940) ; 1 FREEMAN,
JUDGMENTS § 447 (5th ed. 1925) ; RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 107(a) (1942). Where
such notice and opportunity to defend are not given to the indemnitor, he is not
bound by the judgment, but may litigate again every essential fact necessary to support
the judgment. E.g., Burchett v. Blackburne, 198 Ky. 304, 248 S.W. 853, 34 A.L.R.
1425 (1923).
4. E.g., B. Roth Tool Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 161 Fed. 709 (8th
Cir. 1908); Estep v. Bailey, 94 Ore. 59, 185 Pac. 227 (1919); see Hoskins v. Hotel
Randolph Co., 203 Iowa 1152, 211 N.W. 423, 428, 65 A.L.R. 1125 (1926), cert. denied,
275 U.S. 566 (1927).
5. E.g., Harris v. Schrimper, 184 Iowa 1295, 169 N.W. 750 (1918); Pfarr v.
Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 657, 146 N.W. 851, L.R.A. 1915C 336 (1914); J. & R.
Lamb v. Norcross Bros. Co., 208 N.Y. 427, 102 N.E. 564 (1913).
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cation to cases involving liability insurance.6 Thus, under facts substantially
similar to those of the present case, the Massachusetts court held that the
insurer was bound by a finding in the damage suit that the injury was caused
by the negligence of the insured, and that it could not subsequently assert
that the act was intentional so as to show the liability to be beyond the
coverage of the policy.7 Other cases support this same view,8 although it has
not escaped criticism.9
The present court, apparently impressed by strong factual circum-
stances suggesting that the act of the insured had in fact been intentional,
since he had been convicted of second degree murder, took the opposite
position. Observing that it "was not possible for the company in these suits
to defend the insured, and at the same time to protect its own interests," the
court held that the insurer was not bound by the holding that the insured
was negligent, but could now show the facts to be otherwise. The "question
6. E.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 89 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1937); Inter-
national Indemnity Co. v. Steil, 30 F.2d 654 (8th Cir. 1929); B. Roth Tool Co. v.
New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 161 Fed. 709 (8th Cir. 1908); Klefbeck v. Dous,
302 Mass. 383, 19 N.E.2d 308 (1939); Miller v. U.S. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 291
Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935); Jusiak v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 11 N.J.
Misc. 869, 169 Ati. 551 (Sup. Ct. 1933); Stefus v. London & Lancashire Indemnity
Co., 111 N.J.L. 6, 166 Atl. 339 (1933); Jackson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 212 N.C.
546, 193 S.E. 703 (1937); Campbell v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 212 N.C.
65, 192 S.E. 906 (1937); American Casualty Co. v. Brinsky, 51 Ohio App. 298, 200
N.E. 654 (1934).
7. Miller v. U.S. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75 (1935).
"The grounds on which liability has been imposed upon the insured are to be deter-
.mined from an investigation into the matters decided in the action which established
that liability and not from facts subsequently developed in an action by the insured
against the insurer. This is clear from the language of the policy itself wherein the
defendant agreed to pay, not such damages as might be imposed upon the plaintiff
for bodily injuries which were in fact accidental, but all sums which the assured should
'become liable to pay as damages imposed upon him by law for bodily injury accidentally
sustained.' . . . Where an action against the insured is ostensibly within the terms
of the policy, the insurer, whether it assumes the defense or refuses to assume it,
is bound by the result of that action as to all matters therein decided which are
inaterial to recovery by the insured on an action on the policy." 197 N.E. at 77.
To determine what issues were adjudicated in the prior action, the courts look
to the pleadings, the evidence, the instructions to the jury, and the verdict. E.g., B. Roth
Tool Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 161 Fed. 709, 712 (8th Cir. 1908);
Stefus v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 111 N.J.L. 6, 166 Atl. 339 (1933);
Jackson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 212 N.C. 546, 193 S.E. 703 (1937); United Services
Automobile Ass'n v. Zeller, 135 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
8. Jusiak v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 11 N.J. Misc. 869, 169 Atl. 551 (1933);
Stefus v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 111 N.J.L. 6, 166 Atl. 339 (1933); see
Jackson v. Maryland Casualty Co., 212 N.C. 546, 193 S.E. 703, 704 (1937). If the
damage suit establishes facts which show the liability of the insured to be outside
the scope of the insurance policy, the rights of the insured as against the insurer are
thereby concluded. E.g., B. Roth Tool Co. v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 161 Fed.
709 (8th Cir. 1908); American Casualty Co. v. Brinsky, 51 Ohio App. 298, 200 N.E.
654 (1934) ; REsTATEMENT, JUDIltENITS § 107(a), comment h (1942).
9. See Stefus v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 111 N.J.L. 6, 166 At. 339,
340 (1933) (dissenting opinion). If the insurance company cannot subsequently show
that the insured intentionally caused the injury, "it is at the mercy of every un-
scrupulous litigant who, regardless of his facts, sees fit to falsely allege a claim on
which the insurance company would be liable and thereunder establish another claim
on which no liability could attach, and forsooth collect because the insurer cannot
show the true facts." 166 Atl. at 341.
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for decision," said the court, "is not one of estoppel by judgment, but one of
coverage of the contract." The insurance policy covers liability for accidental
injury, and all courts agree that negligent injuries are "accidental" within
the meaning of such policies. 10 Thus, if the insured was adjudged negligent, and
if the insurer is bound by that judgment, then the liability would seem to be
squarely within the language of the policy--"liability imposed . . . by law for
damages . . .because of bodily injury ... caused by accident." As noted by
the district court," the agreement of the insurance company was not to pay
damages imposed for injuries which were in fact accidental, but to pay all
sums which the insured should become obligated to pay by reason of liability
imposed upon him by law for accidental injuries. The court is begging the
question when it says that "the binding effect of a judgment against the in-
sured does not extend to matters outside the scope of the insurance contract":
the very language of the policy compels a reference to the prior judgment to
determine whether the matters therein decided come within the coverage of
the policy. Furthermore, the court says, in effect, that the "unscrupulous"
injured parties, while alleging only negligence in the action against the in-
sured, actually recovered for an intentional wrong. The obvious answer to
such an assertion, however, was given by the court in the Miller case when
it said that a "plaintiff cannot recover for willful and wanton conduct on a
count which alleges only negligence." 12
Actually, the present holding seeks to give effect to a very simple propo-.
sition: if the act of the insured was in fact willful, the insurer should have
the opportunity to establish in law that it was willful. In view of prior holdings,
however, the insurer must find its opportunity before the damage suit against
the insured is adjudicated upon the very ground of its liability to the insured.
Thus, if the insurer is in possession of facts tending to show that the act was
intentional, it might protect itself by entering into a nonwaiver agreement
with the insured before proceeding to defend the damage suit.13 Its safest
remedy would ordinarily be a declaratory judgment of nonliability secured
either before or after the damage suit has been instituted against the insured,
10. E.g., H.P. Hood & Sons v. Maryland Casualty Co., 206 Mass. 223, 92 N.E.
329, 30 L.R.A. (x.s.) 1192, 138 Am. St. Rep. 379 (1910); Rothman v. Metropolitan
Casualty Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N.E.2d 417, 117 A.L.R. 1169 (1938).
11. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 83 F. Supp. 383, 389 (W.D. Va. 1949)
(an exhaustive discussion of the authorities).
12. Miller v. U.S. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 291 Mass. 445, 197 N.E. 75, 77 (1935).
13. This method is subject to several objections, however. "[I]n certain juris-
dictions, the insurer would run the danger of being estopped to controvert the policy
issues, by assuming the original defense. Or, the policy holder might refuse to sign
a non-waiver agreement. Under the doctrine of some states, the insurer must then
either disclaim liability entirely, or accept the defense unequivocally." 8 APPLETAN,
INSULRANCE LAW AND PRACTIcE § 4686 (1942).
Such a nonwaiver agreement will bind the injured person also, even though he
was not notified thereof by the insurer. Suydam v. Public Indemnity Co., 10 N.J. Misc.
868, 161 Atl. 499 (Sup. Ct. 1932) ; Laroche v. Farm Bureau Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,
335 Pa. 478, 7 A.2d 361 (1939).
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but always before that suit has been prosecuted to judgment. 14 The weight of
authority, contrary to the instant case, still warns the insurer that it decides
at its own peril to allow the damage suit to go to judgment before it takes
steps to determine its own obligation under the insurance contract.
BURGLARY INSURANCE-CRIMINAL ACT OF EMPLOYEE OF INSURED-
HARM TO THIRD PERSON AS JUSTIFICATION
Plaintiff purchased comprehensive burglary insurance from defendant,
covering losses not "caused or contributed to by ... any dishonest, fraudu-
lent or criminal act, committed by any Employee . . . of the Assured."
An employee of plaintiff was ordered by armed strangers to take money
from plaintiff's safe and warned that if he did not "they would take care
of" his brother and his brother's wife, who were held as hostages, and that
they "would not forget" him later on. The employee entered the plaintiff's
office alone, obtained the money and subsequently turned it over to the
strangers. Plaintiff seeks to recover on the insurance policy. Held, summary
judgment for defendant affirmed. Plaintiff may not recover because of the
criminal act of his employee. R. I. Recreation Center, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 177 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1949).
Since burglary insurance policies frequently exclude from coverage
losses caused by criminal acts of the insured or his employees, the question
of whether a criminal act has been committed may be controlling in cases
involving such policies.' In the instant case the plaintiff seeks to establish
the nonexistence of a criminal act of its employee by the affirmative defense
of compulsion.
2
Compulsion as a defense in a criminal action other than murder is
allowed only if the compulsion is "present, imminent and impending" and
of such a nature as to induce a well grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm if the act is not done.3 This standard has been strictly
14. E.g., U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Pierson, 97 F.2d 560 (8th Cir. 1938);
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Manning, 92 F.2d 168 (9th Cir. 1937); Central Surety
& Ins. Corp. v. Caswell, 91 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1937); Glens Falls Indemnity Co.
v. Brazen, 27 F. Supp. 582 (M.D. Pa. 1939); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Busch,
22 F. Supp. 72 (S.D. Cal. 1938); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Young, 18 F. Supp. 450
(D.N.J. 1937); Ohio Casualty Ins. Co. v. Plummer, 13 F. Supp. 169 (S.D. Tex.
1935). See also, Appleman, Automobile Insurance and the Declaratory Judgment, 23
A.B.A.J. 553 (1937).,
1. Phoenix Assurance Co. v. Eppstein, 73 Fla. 991, 75 So. 537 (1917) ; Gunn v. Globe
& Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 24 Ga. App. 615, 101 S.E. 691 (1919); Miller v. Phoenix
Assurance Co., 221 Ill. App. 75 (1921); Ledvinka v. Home Ins. Co., 139 Md. 434, 115 Atl.
596, 19 A.L.R. 167 (1921).
2. "In the criminal law, however, there has been a tendency to employ the word
'compulsion' for this general field, and to reserve the word 'coercion' to indicate the
exercise of such influence ... over a married woman by her husband." Perkins, The
Doctrine of Cocrcion, 19 IoWA L. REv. 507 (1934).
3. Shannon v. United States, 76 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935) ; Hall v. State, 136 Fla.
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interpreted and applied,4 with the result that the utility of the defense has
been sharply limited.5 The validity of the defense of compulsion by a threat
to a third person has apparently never been tested by the appellate courts or
treated by the authorities.
Applying the general rule of strict construction in the instant case, the
court correctly held that there was not sufficient compulsion as to the person of
the employee.6 However, the court intimates that compulsion by a threat to a
third person may be a defense to a criminal action.7 Morally, it would seem
that one would be under compulsion to the same extent if his failure to act
would jeopardize the life of another as if the failure would jeopardize his
own life. The doctrine of defense of others is firmly entrenched in criminal
law. Generally one may defend the life of another with the same amount of
force as the person attacked could use.8 Why then should one not be allowed
to defend the life of a third person by yielding to such a threat of harm to
that person's life as would sustain the defense of compulsion if he himself
had been so threatened? 9 Although compulsion by a threat to a third party
should not be a defense to murder, the intent to protect the life of another
should be sufficient to negative the animus furand in larceny. 1°
The court in this case held on summary judgment that even if compulsion
to a third party were a valid defense there was not a well grounded apprehen-
sion of serious bodily harm to the third person.' A clear holding in regard to
644, 187 So. 392 (1939); State v. Clay, 220 Iowa 1191, 264 N.W. 77 (1935) ; Nall v.
Commonwealth, 208 Ky. 700, 271 S.W. 1059 (1925); People v. Merhige, 212 Mich.
601, 180 N.W. 418 (1920) ; State v. Patterson, 117 Ore. 153, 241 Pac. 977 (1925). See 22
C.J.S., Criminal Law § 44 (1940).
4. People v. Villegas, 29 Cal. App. 2d 658, 85 P.2d 480 (1938) ; Ross v. State, 169
Ind. 388, 82 N.E. 781 (1907) ; State v. Clay, 220 Iowa 1191, 264 N.W. 77 (1935) ; People
v. Repke, 103 Mich. 459, 61 N.W. 861 (1895) ; Bain v. State, 67 Miss. 557, 7 So. 408
(1890) ; Turner v. State, 117 Tex. Cr. R. 434, 37 S.W.2d 747 (1931).
5. "It is even more significant that in cases other than murder, rigorous interpretation
of reasonable fear of imminent death renders compulsion a defence of highly dubious
value...." HALL, CRIMINAL LAW 411 (1947).
6. The danger was not imminent and a chance for relief was present.
7. In the majority opinion, Woodbury, J., states, "Perhaps a well-grounded appre-
hension of death or serious bodily injury to another, particularly to a close relative, may
constitute coercion." 177 F.2d at 606. And Magruder, C.J., in a concurring opinion points
out, "As to fear for the bodily safety of a third person, even a close relative, there is a
surprising dearth of authority; but if the question were ever presented under sufficiently
strong, dramatic and convincing circumstances, I am fairly sure the courts would sanction
the defense of coercion." Id. at 606-07.
8. Suell v. Derricott, 161 Ala. 259, 49 So. 895 (1909) ; Stanley v. Commonwealth, 86
Ky. 440, 6 S.W. 155 (1887) ; State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348 (1929) ; Wilkes
v. State, 103 Tex. Crim. R. 148, 280 S.W. 787 (1926). See also MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW
214 (1934).
9. The argument that abuse of the doctrine would allow criminals to escape un-
punished would probably be advanced. Yet this drgument could likewise be made against
such established defenses as self-defense and defense of others. The possibility of abuse
should not be sufficient to invalidate a rule which is otherwise sound.
10. The defense of compulsion has generally been deemed sufficient to destroy the
criminal intent and an act done under compulsion has not been considered a crime.
For further discussion of the theory of compulsion see HALL, CRIMINAL LAW 377-426
(1947) ; Hitchler, Duress as a Defense in Criminal Cases, 4 VA. L. REv. 519, 520 (1917).
11. The court reasoned that "it did not suit the bandits' purposes to shoot in the
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the question was thereby avoided. But perhaps if the evidence of the plaintiff
had been stronger, a result favorable to the defense of compulsion by a threat
to a third person would have been reached. The dictum in this case may mark
the inception of the doctrine in criminal law.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES-MORTGAGEABILITY OF I.C.C. CERTIFICATE OF
PUBLIC CONVENIENCE AND NECESSITY-APPROVAL OF
COMMISSION AS CONDITION PRECEDENT
In 1943, the Acco Transport Company sold its rights under an I.C.C.
certificate of public convenience and necessity to one Jamison. A balance due
on the-purchase price was secured by a chattel mortgage on the certificate.
Jamison entered into partnership agreements with Costello and Gregory,
and in 1944, a court decree divested title out of Jamison and vested it in
Costello and Gregory, subject to the mortgage. In 1947, Costello and Gregory
filed a bill in chancery to have the rights of the parties in the certificate ad-
judicated. The court permitted a foreclosure sale and Acco became the pur-
chaser. The chancellor decreed that the mortgage was a valid encumbrance on
the certificate and that the foreclosure sale vested title in Acco. From this
decree, Costello and Gregory appealed. Held, affirmed. An I.C.C. certificate
of public convenience and necessity is transferable property and subject to
mortgage, although the approval of the I.C.C. will be necessary before Acco
may conduct operations under the certificate. Costello z. Acco Transport Co.,
Tenn. App. W.S., Oct. 14, 1949 (unreported) (Anderson, P. J.).
There may be theoretical difficulties in finding common law property
interests in such rights as inhere in certificates of public convenience; but
the underlying concern is whether adjudication by the court of such interests
would be an encroachment upon the power reserved for the regulatory body.1
Therefore, the problem of whether they are mortgageable should be decided
on the practical basis of how, in fact, the statutes and rules relating to the
transferability of such certificates are applied by the Commission.
As to the theoretical problem of property interests, it is generally stated
that anything which may be transferred or sold may be mortgaged.2 It is in
public streets," and that the employee could not therefore have had a well grounded
apprehension. 177 F.2d at 606.
1. The jurisdictional problem, as such, is not discussed in this casenote. The"primary jurisdiction" doctrine with respect to administrative agencies is discussed in
Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134, 66 Sup. Ct. 37, 90 L. Ed. 1132 (1946) ;
see Davis, Administrative Law Doctrines of Exhaustion of Remedies, Ripeness for
Review, and Primary Jurisdiction. 28 TEXAs L. REv. 376, 404 (1950). Also see Radio
Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 65 Sup. Ct. 1475, 89 L. Ed. 2092 (1945) ;
Southern Broadcasting Corp. v. Carlson, 187 La. 823, 175 So. 587 (1937) (court has
jurisdiction to adjudicate rights between the parties, although only the F.C.C. may approve
operation by a party).
2. E.g., Williamette Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of British Columbia, 119 U.S. 191,
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this connection that there is the concern with "rights" in the certificate.3 Many
of the casesand writers discuss at length whether a certificate is a franchise,
which is generally held to be mortgageable, 4 or a mere personal license, which
has been held not to be transferable or mortgageable.5 To pursue this distinc-
tion leads only to confusion. 6 A certificate is not, usually, an exclusive fran-
chise; but neither is it a mere license.7 Rather, it partakes of the natures of
both; 8 and it is the successor of the franchise.9 At any rate, a certificate is
recognized as a thing of value and is taxable as property.10
Operating rights are clearly transferable where such transfers are au-
198, 7 Sup. Ct. 187, 30 L. Ed. 384 (1886) ; 10 Am. JuL, Chattel Mortgages § 24 (1937);
14 C.J.S., Chattel Mortgages § 21 (1939).
3. That the holder of a certificate possesses no contractual rights, see Roberto v.
Comm'rs of Dep't of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N.E. 321, 322 (1928) ; 60 C.J.S.,
Motor Vehicles § 84(a) (1949). That the certificate carries with it no vested property
rights, see In re Application of Fort Crook-Bellevue B. Line, 135 Neb. 558, 283 N.W.
223, 225 (1939) ; Hart v. Seacoast Credit Corp., 115 N.J. Eq. 28, 169 Atl. 648, 649 (Ch.
1933) (no rights of an equitable nature), aff'd, 116 N.J. Eq. 573, 174 Atl. 525 (1934) ;
Red Eagle Bus Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 625, 180 N.E. 261 (1932);
Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 116 Ohio St. 80, 155 N.E. 694 (1927)
(not a capital asset) ; Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Dunlap, 178 Tenn. 546, 552, 160
S.W.2d 418, 421 (1942) ; 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 84(a) (1949) ; cf. Ashbacker Radio
Corp. v. F.C.C., 326 U.S. 327, 331, 66 Sup. Ct. 148, 90 L. Ed. 108 (1945) ; F.C.C. v. San-
ders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 60 Sup. Ct. 693, 84 L. Ed. 869 (1940) (licenses
for radio stations). Contra: Breeding Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. R.F.C., 172 F.2d 416,
423 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 33B U.S. 814 (1949) ; Texas & Pacific Motor Transport
Co. v. United States, 87 F. Supp. 107, 110-11 (N.D. Texas 1949) ; Reo Bus Lines Co. v.
Southern Bus Line Co., 209 Ky. 40, 272 S.W. 18, 19 (1925); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Board
of Supervisors, 165 Miss. 594, 142 So. 24, 27, rev'd on other grounds, 165 Miss. 594, 143
So. 486 (1932); Willis v. Buck, 81 Mont. 472, 263 Pac. 982, 984 (1928); Houston &
North Texas Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. Johnson, 159 S.W.2d 905, 907 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941), rev'd on other grouds, 140 Tex. 166, 166 S.W.2d 78 (1942) ; Public Utilities
Comm'n v. Garviloch, 54 Utah 406, 181 Pac. 272, 276 (1919) ; Lilienthal and Rosenbaum,
Motor Carrier Regulation by Certificates of Necessity and Convenience, 36 YALE L.J. 163,
168 (1926). Note that many of the above cases involve the granting of another certifi-
cate to a competitor. It is sometimes said that a certificate is not property because it may
be revoked. Cannonball Transportation Co. v. American Stages, Inc., 53 F.2d 1051 (S.D.
Ohio 1931). But see Bailey, Motor Truck Certificates and Permits in Texas: The Certi-
ficate as a Property Right, 21 TEXAS L. REv. 351, 367 (1943). As a practical matter,
certificates are not revoked without cause. Cf. H.H. Enders Truck Line, Inc., 29 M.C.C.
639, 645 (1941); Blanton Trucking Co., 28 M.C.C. 731, 740 (1941). 49 U.S.C.A. §
312 (a) (1949) provides that a certificate may be revoked only for wilful failure to comply
with lawful orders of the Commission.
4. Williamette Manufacturing Co. v. Bank of British Columbia, 119 U.S. 191, 7 Sup.
Ct. 187, 30 L. Ed. 384 (1886); 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 119 (1949) (as to bus
franchises) ; cf. Brown v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 91, 93 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1949).
5. In re Application of Fort Crook-Bellevue B. Line, 135 Neb. 558, 283 N.W. 223
(1939).
6. See Bailey, Motor Truck Certificates and Permits in Texas: The Certificates as a
Property Right, 21 TEXAS L. REv. 351, 355 (1943).
7. Id. at 360-72; Note, 48 COL. L. REv. 88, 91 (1948) (as to airline certificates).
Contra: In re Application of Fort Crook-Bellevue B. Line, 135 Neb. 558, 283 N.W. 223,
225 (1939); Red Eagle Bus Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 124 Ohio St. 625, 180 N.E.
261, 263 (1932); 60 C.J.S., Motor Vehicles § 84(a) (1949).
8. Reo Bus Lines Co. v. Southern Bus Line Co., 209 Ky. 40, 272 S.W. 18, 19 (1925);
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Garviloch, 54 Utah 406, 181 Pac. 272, 275 (1919) ; Lilienthal
and Rosenbaum, Motor Carrier Regulation by Certificates of Necessity and Convenience,
36 YALE L.J. 163, 170 (1926).
9. BARNES, CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 170 (1938).
10. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 165 Miss. 594, 142 So. 24, rev'd on
other grounds, 165 Miss. 594, 143 So. 486 (1932).
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thorized by statute." The statute which authorizes transfers of I.C.C. certi-
ficates limits them by the following words: "pursuant to such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe." 12 In accordance with the
statute, the I.C.C., in 1938, set out the rule that no transfer of a certificate
may be accomplished without prior approval of the Commission.'3
Construing this rule, the United States Supreme Court held in United
States v. Resler that such approval is a condition precedent to a valid trans-
fer. 14 Seemingly, this means that no mortgage could be effective without prior
Commission approval; but the case involved actual operations by a transferee
without I.C.C. approval. Clearly, this is to be distinguished from a case in-
volving the claims of individual litigants to rights in the certificate. 15
That the Interstate Commerce Commission has no general policy against
transferability is borne out by the records of the Commission itself.16 Consent
is refused in some cases, but not without reason.17 Aware that its rule was
being misconstrued, the I.C.C., in August of 1949, amended § 179.1 (d) of
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations to clarify its intended meaning.
This amendment, while said not to involve any change in substance, provided
that the mere execution of a chattel mortgage need not have the approval of
the Commission, "unless it embraces the conduct of the operation by a person
other than the holder of the operating right." IHowever, a "proposed transfer
of operating rights by means of the foreclosure of a mortgage.., shall not be
effective without compliance with these rules and regulations and the prior
approval of the Commission." 18 In the past, the I.C.C. has consented to a
transfer where there was a foreclosure on a mortgaged certificate prior to any
11. See generally, 60 C.J.S., M1lotor Vehicles §§ 84(a), (b), (c) (1949).
12. Interstate Commerce Act § 212(b), as amended, 54 STAT. 924 (1940), 49 U.S.C.A.
§ 312(b) (1949).
13. "No transfer by means of an attempted pledge of any such rights or by any
action purporting to foreclose a pledge upon or lien against any such rights . . . shall
be effective without compliance with these rules and regulations and the prior approval of
the Commission as herein provided." 49 COonE FED. REGS. § 179.1 (a) (Cum. Supp. 1944),
3 FFn. REG. 2157 (1938). These rules were amended slightly, effective Dec. 1, 1943. 8
FF. REG. 12486, 12487 (1943). See 11 I.C.C. PRacr. J. 72, 74-75 (1943). Also see 49
CODE FED. REGS. §§ 179.1(d), 179.2(c) (Cum. Supp. 1944).
14. 313 U.S. 57, 61, 61 Sup. Ct. 820, 85 L. Ed. 1185 (1941); see also Zabarsky v.
Flemings, 113 Vt. 200, 32 A.2d 663, 664 (1943).
15. Costello v. Acco Transport Co., at p. 31 of unpublished opinion.
16. E.g., Blanton Trucking Co., 28 M.C.C. 731, 740 (1941); I-.H. Enders Truck
Line, Inc., 29 M.C.C. 639, 645 (1941); Wilson Truck Co., 25 M.C.C. 150 (1939). But
cf. Gadsden Transfer Co., 32 M.C.C. 349 (1942).
17. Abco Moving & Storage Co., 47 M.C.C. 557, 580 (1947) (transferee not fit,
willing, and able to operate); Oriole Trucking Corp., 44 M.C.C. 150, 151-52 (1944)
(transportation of both exempt and non-exempt commodities in same vehicle would be
unauthorized motor carrier operation) ; Gadsden Transfer Co., 32 M.C.C. 349, 352 (1942)
(cessation of operations).
18. 14 FED. REG. 5049, 5050 (1949).
19. Breeding Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. R.F.C., 172 F.2d 416, 425 (10th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 814 (1949). This case involved foreclosure of a mortgage
on carriers by the R.F.C. which had no authority to operate the carriers, but could only
transfer the rights. On December 12, 1949, the I.C.C. amended § 179.1(c) of Title 49
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application for Commission approval, 19 and presumably this practice will
continue.
The Commission's approval of prior mortgages and transfers is said not
to be an adjudication of legal rights, 20 and such approval evidences that the
transfers are not,. in fact, contrary to the Commission's policy. Thus, the
courts may hold such mortgages valid without encroaching on the Commis-
sion's administrative jurisdiction. And since the transferee is recognized by
the Commission regardless of prior approval, valuable rights in a certificate
may be transferred by means of chattel mortgages. Such mortgages should,
therefore, be upheld. The holding in the instant case seems to be sound.21
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS-MANDATORY MINIMUM
PRICE MARK-UPS ON INTOXICATING LIQUORS
Plaintiff partnership operated a retail grocery market and, under a state
license, sold alcoholic beverages for off-premises consumption. The state
Alcoholic Beverage Control Board suspended plaintiff's liquor license for
selling certain intoxicants at prices below the minimum mark-ups required of
such retailers by statute. Plaintiff obtained a permanent injunction against
of the CODE FED. REGS., effective January 31, 1950. As amended, the rule states: "A pro-
posed transfer of operating rights will not be approved if the Commission finds that the
transferee does not intend to, or would not, engage in bona fide motor carrier operations
under such operating rights, or if the Commission finds that the transferor acquired such
operating rights for the purpose of profiting therefrom and has not engaged in bona fide
motor carrier operations under such operating rights." 14 FED. REG. 7765 (1949). See
also Riss and Co., 38 M.C.C. 563 (1942); cf. David C. Hall, 38 M.C.C. 529, 533-38
(1942). But cf. Falwell v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 71, 79 (W.D. Va. 1946), af'd,
330 U.S. 807 (1947) (approval of transfer not a matter of form) ; Graziani v. Elder &
Walters Equipment Co., 209 La. 939, 25 So.2d 904 (1946) (F.C.C. certificate may not
be transferred without consent of Commission) ; In re Application of Fort Crook-Bellevue
B. Line, 135 Neb. 558, 283 N.W. 223, 225 (1939) (court cannot cause an assignment of
certificate; such right only in the Commission) ; Royal Blue Coaches, Inc. v. Delaware
River Coach Lines, Inc., 140 N.J. Eq. 19, 52 A.2d 763, 764 (Ch. 1947), appeal dismissed,
65 A.2d 264 (1949) (assignment of certificate gave no legal title, but only the right to
apply for approval) ; Hart v. Seacoast Credit Corp., 115 N.J. Eq. 28, 169 Atl. 648, 650
(Ch. 133), aff'd, 116 N.J. Eq. 573, 174 Atl. 525 (1934) (delay in seeking approval caused
rights to be lost) ; Gadsden Transfer Co. 32 M.C.C. 349, 350 (1942).
20. E.g., Brown v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 91, 94 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1949); Riss and
Co., 38 M.C.C. 563, 570 (1942). But cf. "After a full hearing, the Commission approved
the transfer of some of the certificates of convenience and necessity .... By that action,
the Commission gave unmistakable recognition to the validity of the note ... and chattel
mortgages given to the bank." Breeding Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. R.F.C., 172 F2d
416, 425 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 814 (1949).
21. In it re Rainbo Express, Inc., 179 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1950), a result contrary to
that in the instant case had been reached. On rehearing, the federal court reversed its
former holding, held in accord with, and cited the instant case. See also Breeding Motor
Freight Lines, Inc. v. R.F.C., 172 F.2d 416 (10th Cir. 1949); First National Bank v.
Holliday, 47 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1931) (certificate issued by state commission); accord,
Brown v. Smith, 225 S.W.2d 91 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1949) (mortgage executed prior to
promulgation of regulations by I.C.C.); cf. Watson Bros. Transportation Co. v. Jaffa,
143 F.2d 340 (8th Cir. 1944) ; Royal Blue Coaches, Inc. v. Delaware River Coach Lines,
Inc., 140 N.J. Eq. 19, 52 A.2d 763 (Ch. 1947), appeal dismissed, 65 A.2d 264 (1949);
Lennon v. Habit, 216 N.C. 141, 4 S.E.2d 339 (1939); see Hart v. Seacoast Credit Corp.,
115 N.J. Eq. 28, 169 Atl. 648, 649 (Ch. 1933), aff'd, 116 N.J. Eq. 573, 174 Atl. 525 (1934).
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enforcement by the Board of its order suspending plaintiff's license, and the
Board appealed. Held, affirmed; the statute is a denial of due process of law
in that mandatory minimum mark-ups on the retail sale of liquor bear no real
and substantial relation to the declared purpose of the statute to protect the
economic, social and moral welfare of the people of the state. Schwegniann
Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 43 So.2d 248 (La.
1949).
Broadly stated, there are two distinguishable lines of approach under-
lying statutory price measures-the mandatory establishing of prices or price
levels pursuant to statute (including unfair sales acts), and the statutory
endorsement, under fair trade acts, of price-maintenance agreements. The
validity of state legislative minimum price-fixing appears, at least for the
present, to be practically unassailable in the Supreme Court of the United
States,1 which seldom invokes due process to limit the scope of police power.
The term "police power" is often referred to as the governmental instrument
of the state for effectuating those social and economic policies considered de-
sirable for the public welfare.2 It has been held that minimum price regula-
tion may be a proper exercise of that power.3 Early cases in the price-fixing
field required a showing that the regulated business was one "affected with a
public interest," and a considerable amount of legislation was invalidated under
this test.4 The Court, in Nebbia v. New York,5 redefined this requirement so
as to make it virtually meaningless 6 and thereby extended the permissible
field of price regulation. Since the Nebbia decision, the Court has steadily
maintained an attitude of non-interference with regard to state price-fixing.1
1. "In no case since 1934 has it [the Supreme Court] held invalid any extension of
governmental price control. . . . It is questionable whether the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments today interpose any obstacle to legislative price-
fixing." ROTTSCIIAEFFER, THE CONSTITUTION AND SocIO-EcoNoMIc CHANGE, 160, 161
(1948). See the broad language of Mr. Justice Douglas in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.
236, 246, 61 Sup. Ct. 862, 85 L. Ed. 1305, 133 A.L.R. 1500 (1941).
2. For judicial definitions of police power, see language of Mr. Justice Holmes in
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55 L. Ed. 112, 32
L.R.A. (N.s.) 1062 (1911), and that of Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases,
5 How. 504, 583, 12 L. Ed. 256 (U.S. 1847).
3. Public Service Commission of Montana v. Great Northern Utilities Co., 289 U.S.
130, 53 Sup. Ct. 546, 77 L. Ed. 1080 (1933).
4. Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed. 913, 56 A.L.R. 1327
(1928), overruled in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 61 Sup. Ct. 862, 85 L. Ed. 1305,
133 A.L.R. 1500 (1941); Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71
L. Ed. 718, 58 A.L.R. 1236 (1927); Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court, 262 U.S.
522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103, 27 A.L.R. 1280 (1923).
5. 291 U.S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469 (1934).
6. The Court stated that "affected with a public interest" meant no more "than that
an industry, for adequate reason, is subject to control for the public good," 291 U.S.
at 536.
7. See the language of the Court in Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 61 Sup. Ct.
862, 85 L. Ed. 1305, 133 A.L.R. 1500 (1941). A movement in the states since the Ncbbia
decision has brought about passage of unfair sales acts, prohibiting sales below "cost,"
a species of minimum price-fixing legislation the validity of which has not been passed
upon by the Supreme Court. OPPENHEIM f, CASES, COIMENTS, AND MATERIALS ON UNFAIR
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Clearly distinct from statutes which set prices in single industries or
forbid sales below cost (although frequently proceeding on much the same
policy grounds-the restriction of harmful competitive practices) are the fair
trade acts. These statutes legalize contractual price arrangements between
producers and dealers in the vertical chain of commodity distribution, s and
have been upheld by the Supreme CourtY
In the state courts, the constitutional status of both forms of minimum
price regulation, mandatory and permissive, is somewhat less certain. In con-
sidering the former, some of the state courts have retained the older concept
of due process and have, not felt obliged to adopt the federal "hands-off"
attitude evidenced in Olsen v. Nebraska."8 As to the fair trade acts, it appears
that they will continue to be tested in the state courts," despite federal ap-
proval in the Old Dearborn case.1
2
Although the Louisiana statute 13 in the instant case is a resale price main-
tenance measure, it is not precisely analogous either to the general type of
legislation mandating minimum prices or to the fair trade acts, although it is
perhaps more nearly related to the former. Trade-mark alcoholic beverages
may obviously come within the terms of a fair trade act, but the existence of
a valid fair trade act in Louisiana 14 prior to the statute attacked in the instant
case would seem to require that the two not be confused. 15 The statute bears
TRADE PRACTICES 957 (1950). For a discussion of these acts, see Note, Sales Below
Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing under State Law, 57 YALE L.J. 391 (1948).
8. All but three American jurisdictions have enacted fair trade laws, which proceed
on the rationale of the protection of property interests in trade-marked articles. The laws
are permissive in character, rendering valid agreements which otherwise would be viola-
tive of antitrust lgislation. For an excellent analysis of fair trade acts and related unfair
sales acts, see Rose, Resale Price Maintenance, 3 VAND. L. REv. 24 (1949). For a more
restricted consideration, see Coad, Are Montana's Price Fixing Statutes Valid? 11
MONT. L. REV. 21 (1950).
9. Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., 299 U.S. 198, 57 Sup. Ct. 147, 81 L. Ed. 122 (1936);
Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 57 Sup. Ct.
139, 81 L. Ed. 109, 106 A.L.R. 1476 (1936).
10. Here the fundamental constitutional concept that the state supreme court is the
final authority to interpret the state constitution is significant. Under this premise, some
state courts have restricted the scope of state price regulation. Paulsen, The Persistence
of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L. REV. 91, 98-100 (1950).
11. The second Florida fair trade act was overthrown in Liquor Store, Inc. v.
Continental Distilling Corp., 40 So.2d 371 (Fla. 1949), but since that decision a third
such act (Fla. Laws 1949, c. 25204) has been passed. See Note, 2 U. OF FLA." L. REV.
408 (1949). The Illinois Mandatory Fair Trade Act was held void for indefiniteness in
Illinois Liquor Control Comm. v. Chicago's Last Liquor Store, 403 Ill. 578, 88 N.E.2d
15 (1949). See Life, Mar. 6, 1950, p. 31 for account of recent developments with respect
to the New York and California fair trade acts. Several state courts have overthrown, on
a variety of grounds, unfair sales acts, and their validity now seems dubious. OPPENHEim,
CASES, COAMMENTS, AND MATERIALS ON UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES 947-964 (1950);
Thatcher, The Constitutionality of the Unfair Practices Acts, 30 MINN. L. REV. 559
(1946).
12. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 U.S. 183, 57
Sup. Ct. 139, 81 L. Ed. 109, 106 A.L.R. 1476 (1936).
13. LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 8782.49 (Supp. 1949).
14. LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9809.1-9809.6 (1939), upheld in Pepsodent Co. v.
Krauss Co., 200 La. 959, 9 So.2d 303 (1942).
15. See the distinction made by the New York court, in Levine v. O'Connell, 88
N.Y.S.2d 672, 675 (Sup. Ct. 1949), between the New York Fair Trade Law and the
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a feature not common to the bulk of price-fixing measures; namely, it per-
tains only to price regulation of the liquor industry. Intoxicants have long
been regarded as noxious in "character and properly subject to complete state
prohibition,16 or to almost any form of state regulation uniformly applied.
17
The sole reason for the invalidation of the statute in the instant case was
the fact that sales by original producers, bar sales and beer were unaffected by
it and that the measure was therefore not reasonably related to the legislative
purpose of liquor control.ls Under accepted constitutional theory, this con-
clusion will bear little scrutiny. The court appears to invoke "equal-protection"
reasoning to a liquor regulation and concludes that it violates due process,
with little recognition of any presumption of legislative validity.19 It would
seem that the off-premise sale of intoxicants might well have been assumed
by the court to be an appropriate classification for the regulation of alcoholic
beverages. 20 A result almost exactly opposite to the instant holding was
reached by the Kentucky court in upholding liquor price-fixing as a proper
regulation of intoxicants.
2 1
It is highly doubtful that many courts would reach the result of the
instant case on like facts; more probably, most state courts and the Supreme
Court would conclude that since the measure went part way toward accom-
plishing a valid objective, the courts should not interfere. 22 The holding may
bear some relation to the current shift in attitude toward the fair trade and
unfair sales acts,23 although such shift might more properly be reflected in the
legislatures than in the courts. It is unlikely that the decision will have any
effect on the accepted judicial doctrine of the Nebbia case.
state Alcoholic Beverage Control Act (the latter held unconstitutional as delegating
legislative authority). The Kentucky court, in Reeves v. Simons, 289 Ky. 793, 160 S.W.2d
149 (1942), interpreted the Kentucky Distilled Spirits and Wine Fair Trade Act as
though it were a statute similar to that in the instant case and validated mandatory mini-
mum mark-ups as proper for regulation of liquor traffic. The court in the instant case
dismissed the Reeves case as inapplicable. 43 So.2d at 260.
16. Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132, 138, 60 Sup. Ct. 163, 84 L. Ed. 128 (1939);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, 91, 11 Sup. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620 (1890); Mugler
v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657, 657, 9 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205 (1887).
17. For a good discussion of the "liquor immunity" doctrine as applied to regulation
under fair trade legislation, see Note, 57 YALE L.J. 459 (1948).
18. 43 So.2d at 259.
19. Cf. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294, 44 Sup. Ct. 325, 68 L. Ed. 690 (1924).
The Court states, "Where the constitutional validity of a statute depends upon the ex-
istence of facts, courts must be cautious about reaching a conclusion respecting them
contrary to that reached by the legislature; and if the question of what the facts establish
be a fairly debatable one, it is not permissible for the judge to set up his opinion in re-
spect to it against the opinion of the lawmaker."
20. "If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be over-
thrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied." 264 U.S.
at 298.
21. Reeves v. Simons, 289 Ky. 793, 160 S.V.2d 149 (1942). See note 14 supra.
22. See, e.g., Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 23 Sup. Ct. 168, 47 L. Ed. 323 (1903);
Reeves v. Simons, 289 Ky. 793, 160 S.W.2d 149, 151 (1942).
23. See notes 6 and 10 mtpra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-OATH OF ALLEGIANCE AND OATH OF OFFICE
-POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO ENLARGE UPON CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION
The Progressive Party and its nominees for governor and the legis-
lature in the election of 1949 sought to enjoin the enforcement of four state
statutes enacted in 1949 and to obtain a declaratory judgment that the
statutes were unconstitutional. The statutes provided (1) for an oath of al-
legiance; (2) for an oath of office; (3) that all candidates for public
office take the oath of allegiance; and (4) that candidates failing to do so suf-
fer the penalty of having "Refused Oath of Allegiance" printed by their
names on the ballots, this provision applying only to the general election of
1949. The oath of office included eerything in the oath of allegiance, in
addition to a provision for faithful performance of duties; both paths con-
tained clauses of nonbelief in forceful overthrow of the government and of
disavowal of membership in organizations advocating such overthrow..
From reversal of judgment for defendants, they appeal. Held (5-2), affirmed.
The statutes are unconstitutional in that they attempt to add to the qualifi-
cations for public office as prescribed by the state constitution. Imbrie v.
Marsh, 71 A.2d 352 (N.J. 1950).
The New Jersey constitution contains two provisions pertinent to the
instant case. The first of these sets forth a specific oath for members of the
legislature; 1 the other provides that every state officer shall take an oath to
support the constitution and to perform faithfully his duties, but prescribes
no definite wording therefor.2 It was the decision of the court that these
oaths were exclusive; thus, the statutes which attempted to enlarge upon
them were declared repugnant to the constitution and void.3 The dissenting
justices urged that the statutes were valid except as applied to members of
the legislature, for whom a specific oath was included in the constitution.
It is unquestionably the rule that where the constitution expressly or
impliedly makes exclusive the enumeration of qualifications for public office,
the legislature has no power to alter the requisites.4 The total legislative power
1. "Members of the Legislature shall, before they enter on the duties of their
respective offices, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation: 'I do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the State of New Jersey, and that I will faithfully discharge the
duties of Senator (or member of the General Assembly) according to the best of
my ability'. Members-elect of the Senate or General Assembly are empowered to
administer said oath or affirmation to each other." N.J. CoNsT. Art. IV, § VIII, 1 1.
2. "Every State officer, before entering upon the duties of his office, shall take
and subscribe an oath or affirmation to support the Constitution of this State and of
the United States and to perform the duties of his office faithfully, impartially and
justly to the best of his ability." N.J. CoNsT. Art. VII, § I, 1.
3. The basis for striking down these statutes was repugnancy to the constitution
of the state. No federal question nor aspect of due process was involved in the court's
decision.
4. E.g., Mosley v. Board of Comm'rs, 200 Ind. 515, 165 N.E. 241 (1929); Thomas
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of the state, however, is inherently vested in the state legislature, subject
only on limitations prescribed by the state constitution; 5 therefore, a constitu-
tional prohibition must be found in order to deny a particular power to the
legislature. 6 The constitution of New Jersey, unlike those of some states,
7
contains no express direction that the qualifications listed shall be exclusive.
The court, discussing only the first two statutes, declared all four uncon-
stitutional on the ground that the constitution impliedly excluded legis-
lative action, relying on the maxim expressio unius est exchslo alterhus.8
This principle should be applied with extreme caution 9 and not be widely
used in constitutional interpretation, where concise form renders prohibitive
the expression of every conceivable term intended to be included.10
There is, moreover, convincing argument tending to sustain the validity
of the first two statutes under discussion. A statutory oath of allegiance
has been administered in New Jersey since 1776 and applied to members of
the legislature and to public officers generally," in spite of and in ad-
dition to the oath appearing in the constitution. Until the present case, the
legislative power in this respect was not questioned. The legislature's long-
continued interpretation of the constitution is frequently important in re-
solving constitutional questions.12 In addition, a statutory oath of office
has been imposed since 1799 13 and has been varied at the will of the legisla-
ture.14 It was not until 1947 that the constitution provided for an oath of
v. Owens, 4 Md. 189 (1853); State ex rel. Childs v. Holman, 58 Minn. 219, 59 N.W.
1006 (1894); State ex rel. Brazda v. Marsh, 141 Neb. 817, 5 N.W.2d 206 (1942);
Kivett v. Mason, 185 Tenn. 558, 206 S.W.2d 789 (1947) ; accord, People ex rel. Le Roy
v. Hurlbut 24 Mich. 44, 9 Am. Rep. 103 (1871); Cameron v. Connally, 117 Tex. 159,
299 S.W. 221 (1927). But see M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 416, 4 L. Ed. 579
(U.S. 1819). See also 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 139-40 (8th ed., Car-
rington, 1927); MECHEM, PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS §§ 65, 96, 259 (1890);
1 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 625 (2d ed. 1851).
5. E.g., State v. Birmingham So. Ry. 182 Ala. 475, 62 So. 77, Ann. Cas. 1915D 436
(1913); Tierney Coal Co. v. Smith's Guardian, 180 Ky. 815, 203 S.W. 731 4 A.L.R.
1540, modified on rehearing, 181 Ky. 764, 205 S.W. 951, 4 A.L.R. 1540, 1551 (1918);
Jenkins v. State Board of Elections, 180 N.C. 169, 104 S.E. 346, 14 A.L.R. 1247 (1920);
1 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 353-55.
6. See Ex parte Stratton, 1 W. Va. 304 (1866).
7. E.g., MIcH. CoNsT. Art. XVI, § 2; N.Y. CoNsT. Art. XIII, § 1.
8. Of course, a holding that the first statute is void automatically declares the
invalidity of the last two, since they relate only to the application of the oath of alle-
giance contained in the first statute.
9. See Industrial Trust Co. v. Goldman, 59 R.I. 11, 18, 193 AtI. 852, 855 (1937);
2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4917 (3d ed., Horack, 1943). Even where
normally applicable, the maxim will be disregarded where there is an established
custom, usage, or practice to the contrary, as is the situation in New Jersey. See cases
collected, 2 id. § 4917, n.14.
10. JAMESON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS §§ 572-75 (4th ed. 1887).
11. The oath was first prescribed by N.J. Pub. Laws 1776, c.2; it has been reenacted
through subsequent revisions and appeared as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 41:1-1 (1940) until
the present statutes attempted its enlargement.
12. People v. Stevenson, 281 Ill. 17, 117 N.E. 747 (1917); ROTrSCHAEFER, AMER-
ICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18-19 (1939).
13. See 71 A.2d at 354.
14. By N.J. Pub. Laws 1920, c.215, the original oath was enlarged. As expanded,
the oath appeared as N.J. STAT. ANN. § 41:1-3 (1940) until the attempt through the
present statutes to enlarge it further.
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office generally.' 5 The language of the provision, in view of the fact that the
delegates were aware of the existing practice of the legislature, indicates
strongly an intention that it be executed by appropriate enactment rather than
that the legislature be divested of the power.16 Having set out only the sub-
stance of an oath, the people could only have intended that the legislature
elaborate upon it, if any meaning whatsoever is to be attached to their action
in adopting the provision. Further, since a specific oath is designated only
for members of the legislature, while an oath is demanded of all state officers,
the reasonable construction would 'appear to be that the intent was to
prohibit the legislature from enacting its own oath, leaving it free to devise
the oath for officers generally. Collectively, these contentions would seem
to be sufficient to have supported a finding that the legislature of New
Jersey was not impliedly excluded by the constitution from exacting an
oath of allegiance and an oath of office.
Even if one assents to the conclusion of the court that an oath of
allegiance may not be exacted from candidates or from public officers
and that the oath of office may be only an oath of support to the constitution
and- of faithful performance of duties, it remains difficult to understand
how the oath contained in the second statute in question is abusive of this
test. No explanation is forthcoming as to how one can consistently promise
to support the constitution and to discharge faithfully the duties of public
office and at the same time be beset with the mental reservation engendered
by a belief in forceful overthrow of the government or by membership in
a body advocating the same. The absence of the latter is inherent in the
former. Mere political belief is not the criterion of exclusion under the
statutes; only one who could not truthfully subscribe to the oath required
by the constitution would be barred from office by them.
Perhaps the action in this case was taken at least partially in anticipa-
tory fear of the consequences of an unrestricted oath-making power in the
legislature.17 To recognize legislative power to prescribe in specific terms
an oath required by the general language of the constitution, however, is
not to admit an unlimited power in this respect. Of course the safeguards
of personal liberty found in both the Constitution of the United States and
that of the state cannot be infringed upon,' 8 but so long as the oath required
15. The adoption of such requirement was considered and rejected by the conven-
tion of 1844. 71 A.2d at 359.
16. See note 2 supra. It is not directed that the oath be taken, so as to evidence
an intent that all officers take the oath previously prescribed for members of the legis-
lature, but an oath is required.
17. The language of the court indicates a belief that to acknowledge legislative
power in this respect would also extend to the legislature the power to alter the other
requirements for public office, such as age, citizenship and residence. See 71 A.2d at 356.
Obviously, this would not be true where-specific terms are employed in prescribing
the qualifications, unlike the provisions for the oath.
18. E.g., no oath can be upheld which violates the ex post facto or bill of attainder
provisions of the Constitution of the United States. See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall.
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is a reasonable one designed to effectuate the general purpose of the con-
stitutional requirement, its validity should be sustained. Certainly, the oath
of office here required appears to be of that nature.
CONVEYANCES-CONSTRUCTION OF LIMITATIONS-ENTAILING
LANGUAGE AS WORDS OF PURCHASE OR WORDS
OF INHERITANCE
B owned five tracts of land. In 1917, he conveyed two of the tracts to
children by his first marriage. Subsequently, they reconveyed "to B and his
heirs by W" (B's second wife). At the time of the reconveyance, not all the
children of B and W had yet been born. In 1928 B and W attempted to
convey all five tracts to the children of their marriage, reserving a life estate
for their joint lives. After B's death, W's children sued her for a partition. The
court gave judgment for W, from which plaintiffs appealed. Held, reversed.
The reconveyances of the two tracts to B gave him only an estate for life. The
attempted reservation in the 1928 deed of a life estate to W in these tracts
upon her surving B was therefore ineffective, and the land could be partitioned
during her lifetime without her consent. Johnson v. Johnson, 224 S.W.2d 428
(Ky. 1949).
At common law prior to the Statute De Donis,' a conveyance "to B
and the heirs of his body" passed a fee simple conditional,2 an estate which
is still impliedly or directly recognized in at least three American jurisdic-
tions.3 Subsequent to De Donis, the same language created a fee tail estate,
and apparently has that effect today in four states. 4 However, the restrictions
on alienation inherent in the fee tail estate have resulted in its complete aboli-
tion or extensive modification in about three-fourths of the states. In these
277, 18 L. Ed. 356 (U.S. 1867) (oath imposed by constitution of Missouri) and Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 (U.S. 1867) (oath imposed by act of Con-
gress), wherein expurgatory oaths were invalidated on this basis. See Russ, The
Lawyer's Test Oath During Reconstruction, 10 Miss. L.J. 154 (1938), for an inter-
esting discussion of these two cases.
1. Statute De Donis Conditionalibus, 1285, 13 EDW. I, c. 1.
2. After birth of issue to B, the condition was fulfilled and B could convey a fee
simple. However, if B died without issue, or if issue were born but predeceased B, the
estate would revert to the grantor or his heirs upon B's death. BIGELOW AND MADDEN,
INTRO. TO THE LAW OF REAL PROP. 23 (2d ed. 1934) ; see Note, 114 A.L.R. 602, 611-12
(1938).
3. See Sagers v. Sagers, 158 Iowa 729, 138 N.W. 911, 43 L.R.A. (N.s.) 562 (1912);
Davis v. Strauss, 173 S.C. 99, 174 S.E. 908 (1934). In Oregon, De Donis was impliedly
repealed and the fee tail abolished by ORE. Coaxp. LAWs ANN. § 70-105 (1940), thus
reinstating the fee simple conditional. Lytle v. Hulen, 128 Ore. 483, 275 Pac. 45, 114
A.L.R. 587 (1929).
4. See Schneer v. Greenbaum, 4 Boyce 97, 86 Atl. 107 (Del. 1913); McCarthy v.
Walsh, 123 Me. 157, 122 Atl. 406 (1923); Gilkie v. Marsh, 186 Mass. 336, 71 N.E. 703
(1904); Green v. Edwards, 31 R.I. 1, 77 Atl. 188 (1910). Five other jurisdictions ap-




latter jurisdictions, .ntailing instruments are generally given effect in one of
three ways: 5 (1) the language creates an estate tail for the lifetime of the
first taker, succeeded by a fee simple in the next taker; 6 (2) the limitation
gives a life estate to the first taker and a remainder in fee simple absolute to
the next taker; 7 (3) it creates either a fee simple absolute in the grantee or
a fee simple with reversion in the event the first taker dies unsurvived by
descendants.8
Obviously, in a common law entailed conveyance, the intent of the
grantor was to keep the property in the hands of his lineal descendants ad
infinitum. In the United States, however, it seems reasonable that a grantor's
intent in using the same language today is simply to provide for the grantee
and the grantee's children. Thus, the statutes, in the first and second classifica-
tions above, in a sense give effect to the grantor's real intent by creating an
interest in the grantee for his lifetime and a vested remainder in fee in the
grantee's children. The third group of statutes, converting a fee tail into a
fee simple in the first taker, however, runs exactly counter to the grantor's
expressed desire to provide for the children of the grantee. In those jurisdic-
tions, the courts sometimes evidence an inclination to subvert the statute by
construction of the instrument so as to effect that intent.
Before they will find that a fee tail has been created which the statute
would convert into a fee simple in the grantee, the courts must be satisfied
that the language of the granting clause, i.e., "to B and his bodily heirs" or
"to B and his children," was intended to pass an estate of inheritance. The
question is determined by construction of the language of the entire instru-
ment, all its parts being read together as indicia of the intent of the grantor.9
Sometimes a factor completely extrinsic to the conveying instrument, such as
the existence of children of the grantee at the time of the execution of the
deed, may shed additional light on the issue of intent.'0 The court's examina-
tion will result, expressly or impliedly, in an ascertainment as to whether the
5. See the classification in RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY, Introductory Note to Chap. 5
(1936).
6. The donee in tail for his lifetime has an estate with characteristics very similar to
those of an estate in fee simple, except that he may not bar the next taker. See discussion
of further characteristics of this estate in RESTATEMENT, PRoPERTY, §§ 88-96 (1936). See
CoNN. REv. GEN. STAT. § 7083 (1949), Rudkin v. Rand, 88 Conn. 292, 91 Atl. 198
(1914); In re Jones' Estate, 64 N.E.2d 609 (Ohio 1943); Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN.
§ 66-137 (1945), Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wyo. 224, 89 P.2d 1085 (1939).
7. See, e.g., Bibo v. Bibo, 397 I1. 505, 74 N.E.2d 808 (1947); KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 58-502 (Cum. Supp. 1947); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3498 (1939).
8. This is the effect of the statutory provisions in the majority of jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 381.070 (1943), Sallee v. Warner, 306 Ky. 846, 209 S.W.2d
491 (1948); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7599 (Williams 1934), Scruggs v. Mayberry, 135
Tenn. 586, 188 S.W. 207 (1916) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-12 (1950).
9. Ramey v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 673, 243 S.W. 934 (1922).
10. Ewing v. Ewing, 198 Miss. 304, 22 So.2d 225, 161 A.L.R. 606 (1945).
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words "heirs" or "children" in the granting clause were intended by the
grantor to be words of limitation or words of purchase."
At common law, "heirs" and "children" had practically incontestable
connotations when used in deeds, 12 and an estate of inheritance could not be
passed in the absence of the word "heirs," irrespective of the grantor's in-
tent. 13 Even today, where there is no indication of any contrary intent, the
courts will ordinarily apply the common law technical meanings of "heirs"
and "children." 14 However, modern statutes no longer require technical
words in the granting clause of a conveyance. 15 As the precise words of the
instrument are no longer necessarily controlling, the problem of determining
intent has become vastly more important.
The conveyance "to B and his heirs by TV" in the instant case, in its
technical sense, presumptively creates an estate of inheritance which the
Kentucky statute would convert into a fee in B.16 The court, however, ap-
parently assumed that no estate of inheritance was created, but rather that the
only possible construction of the instrument was either a finding of a joint
fstate in B and his children by W or a life estate in B, remainder in the
children ' 7-both impliedly depending upon a construction of the words in
the granting clause as words of purchase (as though the conveyance had read
"to B and his children by W"). Since some, but not all, of B's children by IV
were born at the time of the execution of the deed and unborn children could
not take a joint interest, the life estate-remainder construction was adopted.' 8
The court did not discuss the line of authority holding on very similar facts
that a fee was created.' 9 Authorities cited by the court are distinguishable
either in that the word "children" was actually used by the grantor or in that
11. "Heirs" were held to take by purchase in Ely v. U.S. Coal & Coke Co., 243 Ky.
725, 49 S.W.2d 1021 (1932). "Children" took by inheritance in Ewing v. Ewing, .supra
note 10. See Campbell v. Prestonburg Coal Co., 258 Ky. 77, 79 S.W.2d 373, 376 (1935.
12. Erwin Nat. Bank v. Riddle, 18 Tenn. App. 561, 79 S.W.2d 1032 (E.S. 1934).
13. RESTATEMENT PROPERTY § 27 (1936).
14. Wilcoxen v. Owen, 237 Ala. 169, 185 So. 897, 902 (1938) ; Hartwick v. Heber-
ling, 364 Ill. 523, 4 N.E.2d 965 (1936).
15. See, e.g., TENN. CODE AN.. § 7597 (Williams 1934), Bost v. Johnson, 175 Tenn.
232, 133 S.W.2d 491 (1939). For a listing of other statutes, see RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY
§ 39 (1936).
16. Ky. REv. STAT. AN. § 381.070 (1943) provides, "All estates heretofore or
hereafter created, which, in former times, would have been deemed estates entailed,
shall henceforth be held to be estates in fee simple ..
17. 224 S.W.2d at 430.
18. In Rice v. Klette, 149 Ky. 787, 149 S.W. 1019, L.R.A. 1917B 45 (1912), the
court construed a will "to B and to his children" to create a joint estate in B and his
children, on the reasoning that since other life estates were specifically provided for in
the will, the absence of such language in this instance indicated an intent to pass a joint
interest.
19. Jones v. Mason, 21 Ky. L. 842, 53 S.W. 5 (1899), contains facts strikingly
similar to those in the instant case. When a deed "to B and her bodily heirs" was made,
five children of B had been born. The court held that there was an absence of any indica-
tion in the instrument that the grantor intended the children to take as purclasers and
that B took a fee tail, which was converted by statute into a fee simple. See also Sallee
v. Warner, 306 Ky. 846, 209 S.W.2d 491 (1948) ; McGinnis v. Hood, 289 Ky. 669, 159
S.W.2d 1018 (1942); Simons v. Bowers, 258 Ky. 755, 81 S.W.2d 604 (1935).
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other provisions of the deed clearly indicated an intention to create a life estate
and remainder.20 Thus, the legislative mandate overriding the grantor's intent
was skirted in order to effectuate that intent.
CRIMINAL LAW-PRIVILEGE OF SELF-DEFENSE-DUTY OF OCCUPANT
OF DWELLING HOUSE TO RETREAT FROM ATTACK BY GUEST
Defendant was convicted of first degree manslaughter. Deceased, who
had been residing temporarily in defendant's home as a guest, attacked
defendant in the kitchen of the home with a knife, defendant resisted the
attack and killed her assailant. The prosecution alleged that she could have
safely retreated from the attack by leaving the house or by fleeing to some
other part of it. The court charged the jury that if she could reasonably have
avoided the attack by retreating, she was bound to do so. Held (4-1), the
charge applied the law correctly to the facts in this case; a person attacked in
his dwelling house by one not an intruder must retreat if this is a reasonable
means of avoiding the attack consistent with his own safety. State v. Grierson,
69 A.2d 851 (N.H. 1949).
In general the common law required a person attacked to retreat "to
the wall" before being privileged to use deadly force against ,the attacker in
self-defense. 1 This probably reflected a judgment as to the most effective
method of insuring adherence to the element of "apparent necessity," the
foundation of the privilege of self-defense. It was reasoned that since the
courts are available for the redress of wrongs, the life of the assailant is more
important than any dishonor associated with the idea of retreat.2 The tendency
of the American courts has been not to follow the rule of retreat "to the
wall" but to allow the one attacked to stand his ground and kill if apparently
necessary in self-defense.3
20. Ramey v. Ramey, 195 Ky. 673, 243 S.W. 934 (1922) (deed to B and his "chil-
dren"); Baker v. Baker, 191 Ky. 325, 230 S.W. 293 (1921) (deed to grantee and her
"children by H"; joint tenancy of grantee and children specified elsewhere in instru-
ment) ; Scott v. Scott, 172 Ky. 658, 190 S.W. 143 (1916) (deed to B and her "bodily
heirs by A," but in view of other language in instrument clearly indicating words in-
tended to be words of purchase, life estate and remainder holding adopted).
1. The person claiming the privilege of self-defense must have been without fault
in provoking the attack and must have reasonably believed himself to be in danger of
death or great bodily harm. Henson v. State, 120 Ala. 316, 25 So. 23 (1899) ; State v.
McKinney, 28 Del. 128, 90 At]. 1067 (Ct. Oyer & Ter. 1914) ; State v. Sipes, 202 Iowa
173, 209 N.W. 458, 47 A.L.R. 407 (1926); Hill v. State, 199 Miss. 254, 24 So.2d 737
(1946); People v. Constantino, 153 N.Y. 24, 47 N.E. 37 (1897); Erwin v. State, 29
Ohio St. 186 (1876); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 224, 38 S.E.2d 440 (1946);
Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1903) ; 1 CORNELL L.Q.
179 (1916) ; 3 TEmPLE L.Q. 443 (1929). For a discussion of the law of self-defense in
Tennessee, see Baker, Homicide and Self-Defense, 15 TENN. L. Rav. 288 (1938).
2. 4 BL. Commxf. *185; CLARK AND MARSHALL, CRmIES 351 (4th ed., Kearney, 1940).
3. The position is justified on the grounds that one cannot be forced by a wrongdoer
to yield his rights and that the American mind regards retreat as cowardly. The so-called
"American rule" will not be considered in this discussion because obviously under it no
retreat would have been required in the instant case. La Rue v. State, 64 Ark. 144, 41 S.W.
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Regardless of the rule of self-defense followed, it has been generally
agreed that a man in his dwelling house, who is without fault, may stand at
bay and kill his assailant if apparently necessary even though retreat may be
safely made.4 But if he does flee from the dwelling house, he can no longer
claim the protection of this exception to the general rule of retreat.5 The rule
of nonretreat in the home is a development from the time in medieval history
when men lived in castles for protection from deadly attacks.6 Retreat from
the castle, which was regarded as the ultimate place of refuge and shelter,
increased the danger of such attacks. Hence the idea developed that a man
in his dwelling house was "at the wall" when attacked therein. 7 That is
the sense in which the common law maxim "Every man's house is his castle"
is understood.8 The rule of nonretreat in the home has been extended to apply
to the curtilage of the dwelling house,9 to the office or place of business,"0
to premises not within the curtilage," to clubrooms, 2 and even to an auto-
mobile.'3 A roomer or boarder in a house need not retreat when attacked in
his room since it is said to constitute his castle,14 though he must retreat to his
53 (1897) ; Hammond v. People, 199 Ill. 173, 64 N.E. 980 (1902) ; Runyon v. State, 57
Ind. 80 (1877) ; Willis v. State, 43 Neb. 102, 61 N.W. 254 (1894) ; Fowler v. State, 8
Okla. Cr. Rep. 130, 126 Pac. 831 (1912). A third view of the privilege of self-defense
would consider the possibility of retreat only as one of the considerations in determining
whether the homicide was apparently necessary in self-defense. Brown v. United States,
256 U.S. 335, 41 Sup. Ct. 501, 65 L. Ed. 961, 18 A.L.R. 1276 (1921). See a discussion of
all three views in 41 CoL. L. REv. 733 (1941).
4. Baugh v. State, 215 Ala. 619, 112 So. 157 (1927) ; People v. Lewis, 117 Cal. 186.
48 Pac. 1088 (1897); State v. Leeper, 199 Iowa 432, 200 N.W. 732 (1924) ; People v.
Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E. 496 (1914), 1 CORNELL L.Q. 179 (1916); State v.
Foutch, 96 Tenn. 242, 34 S.W. 1 (1896) ; Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo. 40, 59 Pac. 793, 87
Am. St. Rep. 910 (1900) ; 1 EAST P.C. *287; 1 HALE P.C. *486; 1 WARREN, Ho.xcinr
§ 157 (Perm. ed. 1914) ; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw 867 (12th ed., Ruppenthal, 1932);
Beale, Homicide in Self-Defense, 3 COL. L. REv. 526 (1903).
5. Martin v. State, 90 Ala. 602, 8 So. 858, 24 Am. St. Rep. 844 (1891).
6. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 210 (1934) ; 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL L.-w 867 (12th ed.,
Ruppenthal, 1932).
7. Baugh v. State, 215 Ala. 619, 112 So. 157 (1927); 1 WHARTON, CRIINAL LAW
867 (12th ed., Ruppenthal, 1932).
8. Brinkley v. State, 89 Ala. 34, 8 So. 22, 18 Am. St. Rep. 87 (1890); State v.
Borwick, 193 Iowa 639, 187 N.W. 460 (1922) ; Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo. 40, 59 Pac. 793,
87 Am. St. Rep. 910 (1900) ; Thompson, Homicide in Self-Defense, 14 Am. L. REv. 545,
554 (1880).
9. Fitzgerald v. State, 1 Tenn. Cas. 505 (1875) ; Fortune v. Commonwealth, 133 Va.
669, 112 S.E. 861 (1922).
10. Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8 (1884) ; State v. Sipes, 202 Iowa 173, 209 N.W. 458,
47 A.L.R. 407 (1926) ; State v. Gordon, 128 S.C. 422, 122 S.E. 501 (1924). But when the
place of business is open to the public, the rule has not been applied. Wilson v. State, 69
Ga. 224 (1882) (barroom); Hall v. Commonwealth, 94 Ky. 322, 22 S.W. 333 (1893)
(grocery store).
11. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 Sup. Ct. 154, 41 L. Ed. 528 (1896),
explaining Beard v. United States, 158 U.S. 550, 15 Sup. Ct. 962, 39 L.Ed. 1086 (1895).
See criticism of the application of the rule to this situation in Beale, Holnicide in Self-
Defense, 3 COL. L. REv. 526, 541 (1903).
12. State v. Marlowe, 120 S.C. 205, 112 S.E. 921 (1922), 7 MINN. L. Rv. 59.
13. State v. Borwick, 193 Iowa 639, 187 N.W. 460 (1922). Contra: Clark v. State,
216 Ala. 7, 111 So. 227 (1927) ; State v. McGee, 185 S.C. 184, 193 S.E. 303 (1937).
14. Huff v. State, 23 Ala. App. 426, 126 So. 417 (1930); State v. Sorrentino, 31
Wyo. 129, 224 Pac. 420, 34 A.L.R. 1477 (1924).
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room if attacked elsewhere in the house.15 A guest in the dwelling house of
another need not retreat from the attack of an intruder.
16
Because it was regarded as axiomatic that retreat from the castle increased
danger, the rule of nonretreat in the home was applied not only as to intruders
but also as to those rightfully there-i.e., guests and joint occupants.
17
Present justification of the rule must be that the right to remain in one's own
home in safety is considered more important than the life of one who is
making an attack upon an occupant. As one court expressed it, "Why, it
may be inquired, should one retreat from his own house, when assailed by
a partner or co-tenant, any more than when assailed by a stranger who is
lawfully upon the premises? Whither shall he flee, and how far, and when may
he be permitted to return ?" 18
Is it still socially desirable to deem a man to be "at the wall" when
attacked in his home by a joint occupant even though a way of retreat is open?
The court in the instant case answers that question in the negative, following
the Restateni-ent of Torts, which applies the rule of nonretreat in the home
only to cases of attack by intruders. and guests not residing in the home.19
One court has even intimated that the application of the rule to invited guests
is unsound.20 The tendency of the American courts, however, has been to
extend the application of the rule to places other than the dwelling house rather
than to restrict it to the dwelling house or to a particular class of persons
therein. The position of the New Hampshire court in the instant case is at
least a minority view,21 and perhaps an entirely novel one.
15. State v. Dyer, 147 Iowa 217, 124 N.W. 629, 29 L.R.A. (N.s.) 459 (1910).
16. Kelley v. State, 226 Ala. 80, 145 So. 816 (1933) ; State v. Osborne, 200 S.C. 504,
21 S.E.2d 178 (1942).
17. Bryant v. State, 39 So.2d 657 (Ala. 1949) (wife's attack) ; Baugh v. State, 215
Ala. 619, 112 So. 157 (1927) (wife's attack); Brinkley v. State, 89 Ala. 34, 8 So. 22,
18 Am. St. Rep. 87 (1890) (guest's attack) ; People v. Tomlins, 213 N.Y. 240, 107 N.E.
496 (1914) (son's attack); Beale, Homicide in Self-Defense, 3 COL. L. REV. 526, 541
(1903).
18. Jones v. State, 76 Ala. 8, 16 (1884).
19. 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 65 (1934); cf. RFSTATEMIENT, TORTS, COMMENTARIES
§ 84(c) (i), pp. 18-23 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1926).
20. State v. Bisonnettee, 83 Conn. 261, 76 Atl. 288, 290 (1910). The court in that
case held the assailant to be an intruder in defendant's dwelling house and applied the
usual rule of nonretreat from such an attack.
21. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 213 Pa. 432, 62 Atl. 1064 (1906) was a case wherein
a charge to the jury that the defendant must have reasonably believed that he had no
other means of escape from death was approved. The homicide occurred in the home of
defendant's wife, who was also the deceased's mother. It is not clear from the report
that the defendant and the deceased also occupied the house. If they were guests there,
the holding is not unusual. The case has been cited in support of 1 RESTATEMENT, TORTS
§ 65 (1934). It was intimated in Watts v. State, 177 Ala. 24, 30, 59 So. 270, 272 (1912),
that when joint occupants of a dwelling house occupy separate bedrooms and the attack
takes place in the assailant's bedroom, the one assailed may have a duty to retreat to his
own bedroom, or at least to some other part of the house.
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CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-INSPECTIONS BY
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS
2 Regulations issued by health commissioners required owners and occu-
pants of premises to maintain them in a clean and wholesome condition.
These regulations authorized inspections and made interference with the
inspector a misdemeanor. On a proper complaint, a health officer went to
the home of defendant to make an inspection. Defendant ascertained that
the officer had no search warrant and refused to allow the inspection. She
was convicted of a misdemeanor, but the conviction was reversed by the
Municipal Court of Appeals. Held (2-1), affirmed. Unless there is an
unavoidable crisis, a search without a warrant is prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. District of Columbia. v. Little,
178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949).1
The Fourth Amendment 2 was designed to protect the individual in
his home, to spare him the ordeal endured when general warrants were in
common use.3 The extent of the protection and the circumstances under
which privacy must yield are problems for the judiciary. Judicial inter-
pretation, until recently, has been confined almost entirely to criminal cases.
Ordinarily it has been held that a search without a warrant is illegal unless
made as an incident to a lawful arrest.4 A valid search warrant can be
obtained only for certain purposes,5 and a general "fishing trip" is illegal
even when a warrant is obtained.6 In any event the search must be reason-
able, and reasonableness is determined by the circumstances in each case. 7
As a means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment in criminal cases the
Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained by illegal searches is in-
admissible because of the privilege against self-incrimination given by the
1. Aff'd, 70 Sup. Ct 468 (1950). The Supreme Court did not pass on the constitu-
tional question but held that the defendant's conduct did not constitute interference
within the meaning of the regulation.
2. U.S. CONST. AmEND. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized."
3. Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How.
St. Tr. 1153 (1763); COOLEY, TEE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
232 (3d ed. 1898).
4. United States v. Rabinowitz, 70 Sup. Ct. 430 (1950); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 67 Sup. Ct. 1098, 91 L. Ed. 1399 (1947); Angello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20, 46 Sup. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145 (1925). But cf. Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699, 68 Sup. Ct. 1229, 92 L. Ed. 1663 (1948), 2 VAND. L. REv. 116 (1949).
For a complete discussion of search and seizure see CORNELIUS, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
(2d ed. 1930). See Perkins, The Tenessee Law of Arrest, 2 VAND. L. REV. 509, 614-
22 (1949).
5. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
6. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 52 Sup. Ct. 420, 76 L. Ed. 877 (1932).
7. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 Sup. Ct. 153, 75 L. Ed.
374 (1931) ; Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 Sup. Ct. 261, 65 L. Ed. 647 (1921).
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Fifth Amendment.8 But the real purpose of the Fourth -Amendment is to
guarantee privacy to the individual. 9 In view of this it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between a search in a criminal case and an inspection under a
municipal ordinance or pursuant to some regulatory law not involving
criminal charges. The dissenting judge in the instant case, however, con-
tended that the protection granted by the Amendment is only against search
for and seizure of anything which might be used in a criminal action and
therefore cannot be invoked to prevent a civil inspection.10
It is true that municipal ordinances pertaining to such matters as
plumbing and sewage disposal, zoning regulations, and distribution of food'
and drugs could not be effectively enforced without ihspection." In such
cases, however, the service desired is furnished by the municipality or is
conducted by virtue of its permit, and the right to inspect can be said to
to be a condition of enjoyment. Even in these cases, however, it would seem
that an inspection of a private home could not be made over the owner's
objection unless a court order was obtained.' 2 Health regulations are not
in the same category. Admittedly, the protection of health is of prime
importance in the exercise of the police power 13-so important that the right
to make regulations concerning it has been held to exist as an incidental
power1 4 The public authorities may therefore utilize all necessary means
for promoting public health.' 5 At least one authority states that the legis-
lature may provide for inspection of premises as a health measure, 16 but
the cases upholding the right to inspect have involved public or quasi-
public places. 17 The power to inspect private premises without a warrant
or unless pursuant to a court order does not appear to have been affirmed
or denied by judicial decision prior to the instant case. On principle, it
would seem that inspection against the will of the owner should be based
on judicial authority complying with constitutional requirements in regard
to searches,' 8 and this in spite of the fact that the great majority of the
8. E.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616. 6 Sup. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746 (1886).
9. Wood, The Scope of the Contitutional Immunity Aganst Search and Seizure,
34 W. VA. L.Q. 1 (1927).
10. 178 F.2d at 22. The dissent is strongly supported by Stahl and Kuhn, Inspections
and the Fourth, Amendment, 11 U. OF PiTr. L. REv. 256 (1950).
11. Savage v. District of Columbia, 54 A.2d 562 (D.C. Munic. App. 1947) (housing
regulations) ; Keiper v. Louisville, 152 Ky. 691, 154 S.W. 18 (1913) (food inspection) ;
Cxommonwealth v. Dougherty, 156 Pa. Super. 520, 40 A.2d 902 (1945) (water pipes and
sewage conduits).
12. FREUxD, THE POLICE POWER § 48 (1904).
13. Commonwealth v. Town of Hudson, 315 Mass. 335, 52 N.E.2d 566 (1943); 7
MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 24.221 (3d ed. 1949).
14. Gundling v. Chicago, 176 Ill. 340, 52 N.E. 44 (1898).
15. Huffman v. District of Columbia, 39 A.2d 558 (D.C. Munic. App. 1944); People
ex" rel. Baker v. Strautz, 386 Ill. 360, 54 N.E.2d 441 (1944).
16. 25 Ami. JUR., Health § 28 (1940).
17. Hubbell v. Higgins, 148 Iowa 36, 126 N.W. 914 (1910); State v. Normand, 76
N.H. 541, 85 Atl. 899 (1913).




populace would probably accede to official requests to inspect their premises
pursuant to health ordinances and similar regulations.
Privacy, in the sense of freedom from arbitrary governmental inter-
ference, is one of the fundamental rights granted to the people by the
Constitution. To hold that this right applies only to criminal law adminis-
tration and affords no protection from official scrutiny under various regu-
latory laws where criminality is not involved would be strange. Equal pro-
tection should be afforded in both instances and the same rule of reasonableness
applied in each case. In case of an unavoidable crisis, under threat of an
epidemic, or of a pressing emergency, the rights of the public may be
superior to those of the individual, but until such a situation occurs, he
should be secure in the privacy of his home.
DAMAGES-BREACH OF CONTRACT TO CONVEY REAL.TY-EFFECT OF
REFUSAL OF VENDOR'S SPOUSE TO JOIN IN CONVEYANCE
Plaintiff sought damages for defendant's breach of a contract to sell
certain realty. After plaintiff had made the down payment, defendant was un-
able to deliver a deed because his wife, who owned an undivided half interest
in the realty, refused to join in the conveyance. The defendant returned the
down payment, and he and his wife subsequently conveyed to another person.
Defendant was found to have acted in good faith and without positive fraud.
From a judgment for only nominal damages, plaintiff appeals. Held, reversed.
Plaintiff can recover substantial damages, irrespective of defendant's good
faith. Raisor v. Jackson, 225 S.W.2d 657 (Ky. 1950).
The general measure of damages for breach of contract provides such
compensation as will place the injured party in the position he would have
enjoyed had the contract been performed.1 In case of an executory contract
to convey realty, this would mean the difference between the contract price
and the fair market value of the property at the agreed date of conveyance,
commonly referred to as "loss of bargain." 2
With respect to contracts to convey realty, however, an exception to the
fundamental rule of damages was introduced in England in 1776 by the case
of Flureau v. Thornhill.3 The so-called English rule there enunciated provided
that if a vendor who acted in good faith, being previously unaware of any
defect, could not make good title, the purchaser's recovery was limited to the
1. McCoP.icK, DAMAGES § 137 (1935); 1 SEDGWXCK, MrASURE OF DAMAGES § 30
(9th ed., Sedgwick & Beale, 1920); 2 SUT'ERLAND, DAMAGES § 566 (3d ed., Berry-
man, 1903).
2. Of course, any amount paid toward the purchase price is taken into account.
See Note, 48 A.L.R. 12, 15-17 (1927).
3. 2 W. B. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (K.B. 1776).
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return of his purchase money, plus interest and costs. 4 Although English
courts often followed the doctrine with reluctance,5 it was expanded in 1874
to include instances where the seller knew at the time of the contract that
his title was defective.
6
Approximately half of the American jurisdictions have adopted the
English rule of nominal damages in cases where the vendor acted in good
faith and without knowledge of any defect in his title.7 Two courts which
follow the English rule, however, have narrowed it so as to prevent its applica-
tion to executory contracts.8 And most American courts have applied the rule
of substantial damages where the vendor knowingly contiacts to sell property
in which a third person holds an interest.9 Some courts have done so in spite
of his good-faith belief that he will be able to obtain the interest in time to
make the conveyance in pursuance of his contract. 10 A number of courts have
specifically held that where the breach is occasioned by the refusal of the
vendor's spouse to join in the conveyance, the breach itself constitutes fraud
sufficient to enable the vendee to recover for loss of his bargain." In recent
years particularly there has been a trend away from the English position.1
2
4. This is the rule of nominal damages allowed by the trial court in the instant case.
The "costs" referred to is the expense of investigation of title.
5. See Hopkins v. Grazebrook, 6 B. & C. 31, 108 Eng. Rep. 364 (K.B. 1826), draw-
ing a very questionable distinction from the Flureau case.
6. "If a person enters into a contract for the sale of a -real estate knowing that he
has no title to it, nor any means of acquiring it, the purchaser cannot recover damages
beyond the expenses he has incurred by an action for the breach of the contract ..
Bain v. Fothergill, L.R. 7 H.L. 158, 207 (1874).
7. E.g., Emmert v. Jelsma & Holdebrand, 191 Iowa 424, 182 N.W. 652 (1921);
Markoff v. Kreiner, 180 Md. 150, 23 A.2d 19 (1941); Kargiatly v. Provident Trust Co.,
338 Pa. 358, 12 A.2d 11 (1940) ; Eagle Pass Lumber Co. v. The Amortibanc, 124 S.W.2d
186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939); Horner v. Holt, 187 Va. 715, 47 S.E.2d 365 (1948). See also
cases collected in Notes, 48 A.L.R. 12, 14-17, 19-21 (1927), 68 A.L.R. 137, 138-141
(1930) ; 55 Aid. JuR., Vendor and Purchaser §§ 557, 558 (1946); HALE, DAMAGES § 159
(2d ed., Cooley, 1912) ; McCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 177, 179 (1935) ; 3 SEDGWICK, MEASURE
OF DAMAGES § 1006 (9th ed., Sedgwick & Beale, 1920); 2 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES
§§ 579, 580 (3d ed., Berryman, 1903). Several states have adopted the rule by statute.
CAL. CiV. CODE § 3306 (1941); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 17-306 (1947); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2:45-1 (1939); OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 27 (1941).
8. Snodgrass v. Reynolds, 79 Ala. 452, 58 Am. Rep. 601 (1885); Matheny v.
Stewart, 108 Mo. 73, 17 S.W. 1014, 1015 (1891).
9. E.g., Beck v. Staats, 80 Neb. 482, 114 N.W. 633, 16 L.R.A. (N.s.) 768 (1908);
McCarty v. Lingham, 111 Ohio St. 551, 146 N.E. 64 (1924). See also cases collected in
66 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser § 1703 (1934).
10. E.g., Grosso v. Sporer, 123 Misc. 796, 206 N.Y. Supp. 227 (Sup. Ct. 1924);
Matthews v. La Prade, 144 Va. 795, 130 S.E. 788 (1925).
11. E.g., Greenberg v. Ray, 214 Ala. 481, 108 So. 385 (1926); Key v. Alexander,
91 Fla. 975, 108 So. 883 (1926); Puterbaugh v. Puterbaugh, 7 Ind. App. 280, 33 N.E.
808 (1893); McAdam v. Leak, 111 Kan. 704, 208 Pac. 569 (1922); Greer v. Doriot,
137 Va. 589, 120 S.E. 291 (1923) (exchange of realty) ; Stone v. Kaufman, 88 W. Va.
588, 107 S.E. 295 (1921). Contra: Gerbert v. Congregation of the Sons of Abraham,
59 N.J.L. 160, 35 Atl. 1121, 69 L.R.A. 764, 59 Am. St. Rep. 578 (Ct. Err. & App. 1896)
(refusal of representatives of deceased wife) ; Burk v. Serrill, 89 Pa. 413, 21 Am. Rep.
105 (1876).
12. E.g., Liberis v. Carmeris, 107 Fla. 352, 146 So. 220 (1933) (notice of breach
preceded excuse of wife's refusal); Bulkley v. Rouken Glen, Inc., 222 App. Div. 570,
226 N.Y. Supp. 544 (2d Dep't 1928), aff'd, 248 N.Y. 647, 162 N.E. 560 (1928) (arbitrary
refusal, knowingly contracting beyond power, fraud or bad faith) ; Spruill v. Shirley, 182
Va. 342, 28 S.E.2d 705 (1944) (knowingly contracting beyond power).
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Thus, the prevailing American view in a case of the present type-where the
vendor knowingly contracts beyond his power, but in good faith believes he
will be able to secure the cooperation needed to meet his obligation-is con-
trary to the English rule; and the vendor must respond in substantial damages
for his breach.
The English view is defended on the ground that one contracting to
convey real property is bound only on condition that he has good title.13 In
-America, however, an implied warranty of title is raised by the vendor's
making the contract; 14 and a vendor who contracts beyond his power is not
excused from liability. 15 The intricate and complex nature of English land
titles has been advanced as another circumstance demanding application of
the English rule.16 The force of this argument was destroyed in America,
however, by the advent of the recording system, one purpose of which was to
ameliorate complications and doubts with regard to titles.17 Further considera-
tions pointing to the correctness of the American view are that the vendor
can protect himself against failure of title by insertion of a condition within
the contract and that the rule places a seller of realty on the same basis as a
seller of personal property.18
The Kentucky court in the present case overrules a previous decision in
which good faith of the vendor was held to limit the vendee's recovery. 19 The
holding of the instant case is limited to instances in which the vendor know-
ingly contracts in excess of his power and does not preclude the application of
the good-faith rule in Kentucky in cases where the vendor does not know of his
inability to convey.20 In yielding to convincing argument 21 the court has taken
a forward step in clarifying the position of that jurisdiction and in bringing
it into accord with the majority position.
13. See Blackstone's opinion in Flureau v. Thornhill, 2 W. B1. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep.
635 (K.B. 1776).
14. "[A]n executory contract for the sale of land imports an implied warranty, on
the part of the vendor, that he is the owner of, and has power to convey, a good title
thereto. .. ." 6 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser § 516 (1934).
15. "One who makes a promise which cannot be performed without the consent or
cooperation of a third person is not excused from liability because of inability to secure
the required consent or cooperation, unless the terms or nature of the contract indicate
that he does not assume this risk." 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1932 (2d ed., 1938).
16. HALE, DAMAGES § 159 (2d ed., Cooley, 1912).
17. SEDGWlCx, ELEMENTS OF DAMAGES 320 (1896).
18. See, for additional considerations, Doherty v. Dolan, 65 Me. 87, 91, 20 Am.
Rep. 677, 680 (1876).
19. "All that we have is the wife's refusal to join in the deed. The husband's dominion
over the wife is not what it once was. The wife of today has asserted and established her
independence. She does not always yield to the wishes or even the advice of her husband,
but frequently exercises her own judgment. Because of this situation we are not inclined
to hold that the refusal of the wife, without more, is sufficient to show fraud or connivance
on the part of her husband." Potts v. Moran's Ex'rs, 236 Ky. 28, 32 S.W.2d 534, 536
(1930).
20. 225 S.W.2d at 660.
21. For an attack on the previous stand of the court on this question, see Carnahan,
The Kentucky Rile of Damages for Breach of Executory Contracts to Convey Realty,
20 Ky. L.J. 304 (1932).
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DAMAGES-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-REQUIREMENT THAT ACTUAL
DAMAGES BE SHOWN AS A PREDICATE TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Upon a complaint signed and sworn to by the defendant a warrant issued
for the arrest of plaintiff and he was prosecuted for a misdemeanor. The
prosecution having terminated favorably for the plaintiff, he brought an action
for damages for malicious prosecution. The jury returned a verdict for the
plaintiff awarding no compensatory damages bit assessing exemplary damages
of $2500. Defendant's motion for judgment n.o.v. was granted and plaintiff
appealed. Held, reversed; judgment for the plaintiff in conformity with the
verdict. Where actual damage has been shown, though not its money extent,
entitling plaintiff to nominal damages at best, he is nevertheless entitled to
have the cause submitted to the jury on the question of exemplary damages.
Fauver v. Wilkoske, 211 P.2d 420 (Mont. 1949).
As a general proposition exemplary damages are not recoverable in a
tort action unless they are predicated upon a finding of actual damages.' The
reason generally assigned is that exemplary damages are given by way of
punishment and not as compensation, and the right to their recovery is a mere
incident to a cause of action brought for compensation. 2 In a number of
jurisdictions, however, a contrary rule prevails, and neither actual nor nominal
damages need be found.3 Where the general rule obtains, exemplary damages
may be recovered though the actual damages shown are small 4 or even where
the amount is not capable of exact calculation. 5 Where a showing of actual
damages is required, there is a conflict in the decisions as to whether nominal
damages are sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. While the
1. Boehne v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 10 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Tex. 1935);
Longinotti v. Rhodes, 220 S.W.2d 812 (Ark. 1949) ; Brewer v. Second Baptist Church,
32 Cal. 2d 791, 197 P.2d 713 (1948); McConathy v. Deck, 34 Colo. 461, 83 Pac. 135,
4 L.R.A. (N.s.) 358, 7 Ann. Cas. 896 (1905); Stacy v. Portland Pub. Co., 68 Me. 279
(1878); Richard v. Hunter, 151 Ohio St. 185, 85 N.E.2d 109 (1949); Allen v. Melton,
20 Tenn. App. 387, 99 S.W.2d 219 (M.S. 1936) ; BizzeUl v. Clark, 203 S.W.2d 998 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947); Ennis v. Brawley, 129 W. Va.' 621, 41 S.E.2d 680 (1946); 2 SUTHER-
LAND, DAMAGES § 406 (3d ed., Berryman, 1903). See Notes, 33 A.L.R. 384 (1924), 81
A.L.R. 913 (1932), 123 A.L.R. 1115, 1120 (1939).
2. Shore v. Shore, 111 Kan. 101, 205 Pac. 1027, 1028 (1922) ; Hoagland v. Forest
Park Highlands Amusement Co., 170 Mo. 335, 70 S.W. 878, 880, 94 Am. St. Rep. 740
(1902). See McClellan, Exemplary Damages in Indiana, 10 IND. LJ. 275 (1935);
15 AMf. JUR., Damages § 266 (1938).
3. Scalise v. National Utility Service, 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1941); Wardman-
Justice Motors v. Petrie, 39 F.2d 512, 69 A.L.R. 648 (D.C. Cir. 1930) ; Press Pub. Co. v.
Monroe, 73 Fed. 196 (2d Cir. 1896); Fields v. Lancaster Cotton Mills, 77 S.C. 546,
58 S.E. 608, 122 Am. St. Rep. 593, 11 L.R.A. (N.s.) 822 (1907). See 1 SDGVwICK,
DAMAGES § 361 (9th ed., Sedgwick & Beale, 1920).
4. Foster v. Sikes, 202 Ga. 122, 42 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1947) ; International Harvester
Co. v. Iowa Hardware Co., 146 Iowa 172, 122 N.W. 951, 953, 29 L.R.A. (N.s.) 272
(1909) ; Long v. Davis, 68 Mont. 85, 217 Pac. 667, 668 (1923). See Notes, 33 A.L.R.
384, 398 (1924), 81 A.L.R. 913, 916 (1932).
5. Clark v. McClurg, 215 Cal. 279, 9 P.2d 505, 506, 81 A.L.R. 908 (1932) ; Living-
ston v. Utah-Colorado Land & Live Stock Co., 106 Colo. 278, 103 P.2d 684, 685 (1940) ;
Lane v. Mitchell, 153 Iowa 139, 133 N.W. 381, 383, 36 L.R.A. (N.s.) 968 (1911);
State cx rel. St. Joseph Belt Ry. v. Shain, 341 Mo. 733, 108 S.W.2d 351, 356 (1937);
Long v. Davis, 68 Mont. 85, 217 Pac. 667, 668 (1923).
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majority of states consider nominal damages insufficient,6 many jurisdictions
h6ld that exemplary damages will be sustained although the damages are only
nominal.
7
The early cases held that an action for malicious prosecution could not be
maintained unless actual damages were suffered by the plaintiff.8 More
recently; however, it has been held that such damages may be recovered though
not pleaded or specially proved, on the ground that they necessarily follow
from the prosecution.9 The instant case overrules the earlier case of Gilham v.
Devereaux,10 one of the leading cases upholding the majority view that actual
damages must be found as a predicate for the award of exemplary damages.,
In so doing it reaffirms the rule announced in Long v. Davis,'2 holding that
where actual damages are shown but are only nominal because their money
extent is not shown, exemplary damages will be sustained."
Though not expressly so stating the court in this case has gone a long
way toward eliminating the necessity for actual compensatory damages to
6. Thompson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 83 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Iowa
1949) ; Alexander v. Jones, 29 F.Supp. 690, 692 (E.D. Okla. 1939) ; Jacob v. Miner, 67
Ariz. 109, 191 P.2d 734, 742 (1948); Longinotti v. Rhodes, 220 S.W.2d 812 (Ark.
1949; Haydel v. Morton, 8 Cal. App. 2d. 730, 48 P.2d 709,. 712 (1935); McLain v.
Pensacola Coach Corp., 152 Fla. 876, 13 So. 2d 221, 222 (1943) ; Reeda v. Tribune Co,,
218 Ill. App. 45, 48 (1920); Connelly v. White, 122 Iowa 391, 98 N.W. 144 (1904);
Shore v. Shore, 111 Kan. 101, 205 Pac. 1027, 1028 (1922) ; Stacy V. Portland Pub. Co..
68 Me. 279, 287 (1878) ;Meixner v. Buecksler, 216 Minn. 586, 13 N.W.2d 754, 757
(1944); McCain v. Cochran, 153 Miss. 237, 120 So. 823, 828 (1929); McClanahan v.
Koviak, 62 Ohio App. 307, 23 N.E.2d 975, 977 (1939) ; Browi v. Higby, 191 Okla. 173,
127 P.2d 195, 196 (1942) ; Martin v. Cambas, 134 Ore. 257, 293 Pac. 601 (1930) ; Roberts
v. Shaffer, 36 S.D. 551, 156 N.W. 67, 68 (1916); Allen v. Melton, 20 Tenn. App. 387,
99 S.W.2d 219, 225 (M.S. 1936); Meadows v. First Nat. Bank, 149 S.W.2d 591, 592
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Moore v. Duke, 84 Vt. 401, 80 Ati. 194, 197 (1911); Ennis v.
Brawley, 129 W. Va. 621, 41 S.E.2d 680, 683 (1946) ; Barnard v. 'Cohen, 165 Wis. 417,
162 N.W. 480 (1917) ; Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 Pac. 862, 867 (1927).
See 2 SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES § 406 (3d ed., Berryman, 1903).
7. Gardella v. Log Cabin Products Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937); Wilson v.
Vaughn, 23 Fed. 229 (C.C.D. Kan. 1885); Goodson v. Stewart, 154 Ala. 66, 46 So.
239 (1908); Foster v. Sikes, 202 Ga. 122, 42 S.E.2d 441 (1947); Crystal Dome Oil &
Gas Co. v. Savic, 51 Idaho 409, 6 P.2d 155 (1931); Louisville & N.R:R. v. Ritchel, 148
Ky. 701, 147 SAV. 411, 41 L.R.A. (,.s.) 958 (1912); Heinze v. Murphy, 180 Md. 423,
24 A.2d 917 (1942); Edwards v. Nulsen, 347 Mo. 1077, 152 S.W.2d 28 (1941); Long v.
Davis, 68 Mont. 85, 217 Pac. 667 (1923) ; Parris v. H. G. Fischer & Co., 221 N.C. 110,
19 S.E.2d 128 (1942); Cook v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 183 S.C. 279, 190 S.E. 923
(1937).
8. Gordon v. McLearn, 123 Ark. 496, 185 S.W. 803 (1916); International Har-
vester Co. v. Iowa Hardware Co., 146 Iowa 172, 122 N.W. 951, 29 L.R.A. (N.s.) 272
(1909) ; Schippel v. Norton, 38 Kan. 567, 16 Pac. 804 (1888) ; Roos v. Goldman, 36
La. Ann. 132 (1884); Stanford v. Grocery Co., 143 N.C. 419, 55 S.E. 815 (1906);
Harris v. Finberg, 46 Tex. 79 (1876). See PROSSER, TORTS 883 (1941).
9. Parisian Co. v. Williams, 203 Ala. 378, 83 So. 122 (1919) ; Johnston v. Deide-
sheimer, 76 Colo. 559, 232 Pac. 113 (1925) ; Dorr Cattle Co. v. Des Moines Nat. Bank, 127
Iowa 153, 98 N.W. 918 (1904); Barnes v. Culver, 192 Ky. 10, 232 S.W. 39 (1921);
Grorud v. Lossl, 48 Mont. 274, 136 Pac. 1069 (1913) ; Goodwin v. Marsh, 4 Tenn. App.
23 (E.S. 1926). See MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 108 (1935).
10. 67 Mont. 75, 214 Pac. 606, 33 A.L.R. 381 (1923) (alienation of affections).
11. See notes 1, 6 supra.
12. 68 Mont. 85, 217 Pac. 667, 668 (1923).
13. "Where actual damages have been shown, though the testimony is insufficient
to show its money extent, thus entitling plaintiff at best to no more than nominal dam-
ages, he was nevertheless entitled to have the cause submitted to the jury on the ques-
tion of exemplary damages pleaded by him." 211 P.2d at 426.
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sustain an action for malicious prosecution. This seems more in accordance
with reason and justice than the holding of those cases which require a finding
of actual damages as a predicate to an award of exemplary damages. If the
necessary culpability on the part of the defendant is established, why should the
plaintiff be denied recovery of exemplary damages when his actual damages are
nominal or not capable of exact calculations? The purpose in awarding
exemplary damages is to discourage aggravated torts.' 4 Therefore, when there
has been a breach of a duty giving rise to a cause of action for malicious
prosecution, the monetary extent of plaintiff's injury would seem to be
iimaterial.15
EVIDENCE-BLOOD-GROUPING TESTS IN BASTARDY PROCEEDINGS-
EFFECT OF JURY VERDICT CONTRARY TO RESULT OF TEST
In a bastardy proceeding against- defendant, plaintiff testified that she
had intercourse with defendant during the critical period and that no one but
he could be the father of her twins. Defendant, pursuant to statute,' moved to
have blood-grouping tests made, and these tests excluded him from paternity.
The jury returned a verdict declaring defendant to be the father. Defendant
entered a motion for a new trial. Held, motion sustained. A jury verdict of
paternity will be set aside and a new trial granted when exclusion of paternity
is shown by blood-grouping tests. Jordon v. Mace, 69 A.2d 670 (Me. 1949).
Blood-grouping tests excluding paternityare accepted in European courts
as unanswerable proof of nonpaternity, and such tests are compulsory in
every affiliation case. 2 American courts have been less- impressed by the
significance of this scientific discovery. In the first case involving the
problem, it was held that the results of the tests were inadmissible.3 Since then,
however, most American courts have recognized that the tests have sufficient
probative value to go to the jury along with other evidence. 4 Only a few courts
14. See note 2 supra.
15. See McClellan, Exemplary Damages in Indiana, 10 IND. L.J. 275 (1935); Mc-
Cormick, Some Phases of the Doctrine of Exemplary Damages, 8 N.C.L. Rav. 129, 149
(1930) ; 17 IowA L. REv. 413 (1932) ; 16 MiNx L. REv. 438 (1932) ; 10 TEXAS L. REv.
238 (1932); 18 U. oF CIN. L. REv. 545 (1949).
1. Ma. REv. STAT. c. 153, § 34 (1944). The statute makes it mandatory upon the
court to order blood-grouping tests upon the defendant's motion.
2. Schatkin, Law and Science in Collision: Use of Blood Tests in Paternity Suits,
32 VA. L. Rav. 886, 900 (1946). For a scientific discussion of blood-grouping theories,
see Denton, Blood Groups and Disputed Parentage, 27 CAN. B. Rzv. 537 (1949).
3. State v. Damm, 62 S.D. 123, 252 N.W. 7, 104 A.L.R. 430 (1933), aff'd on
rehearing, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936). The court pointed out that the decision
was based on the fact that the tests at the time of the first trial were not generally
accepted as reliable; hence it was within the discretion of the trial judge at that time
to refuse to admit the evidence.
4. Beach v. Beach, 114 F.2d 479, 131 A.L.R. 804 (D.C.Cir. 1940); Arais v.
Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043, 115 A.L.R. 163 (1937) ; Schanks v. State, 185
Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85, 163 A.L.R. 931 (1945) ; In re Lentz, 247 App. Div. 31, 283 N.Y. Supp.
1950)
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have gone as far as the instant case and set aside a verdict of paternity upon
the basis of exclusion by glood-grouping tests,5 and no American jurisdiction
has reached the point of directing a verdict for the defendant on the results
of these tests. The explanation of this may be found in the rules of trial
practice; the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the
weight of testimony. Even when there is neither a contradiction nor an
attack upon the credibility of the only witness to a given fact, it is not
ordinarily a proper function of the trial judge to direct a verdict on the basis
of such testimony, for it is still the jury's privilege to disbelieve the witness. 6
At first this seems somewhat inconsistent with the oath of the jury to try
the case according to the evidence, but apparently implicit in .the phrase "try
the case" is the privilege to disbelieve the evidence presented. This leads to
amazing results at times. In'Berry v. Chaplin,7 the court noted that blood-
grouping tests were matters of common knowledge, that the results proved
exclusion, and that the character and credibility of the experts were not
questioned; yet, since the California statute 8 did not make the results of the
tests conclusive, the court felt bound to follow the precedent of Avais v.
Kalensnikoff 9 and to uphold a verdict of paternity.
The statutes in states having legislation on the subject are similar to that
in the instant case. 10 They allow the defendant alone to request the tests, a
recognition that the tests have value only in proving nonpaternity." Where
no statute is involved, the question sometimes arises, particularly in divorce
cases, as to whether or not the test can be made if the woman concerned
objects.12 A New Jersey court has held that it would constitute an assault and
battery to order an unwilling wife to submit to the tests.'8 Pennsylvania has.
taken the novel position that until paternity can be shown affirmatively as
well as negatively it would be unreasonable to require the woman to submit
749 (2d Dep't 1935) ; State v. Clark, 144 Ohio St. 305, 58 N.E.2d 773 (1944); Common-
wealth v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931) ; Euclide v. State, 231 Wis. 616, 286 N.W.
2 (1939). For a composite picture of the status of blood-grouping tests in American and
foreign jurisdictions, see Galton, Blood-Grouping Tests and Their Relationship to the
Law, 17 OmE. L. REv. 177 (1938).
5. State v. Wright, 59 Ohio App. 191, 17 N.E.2d 428 (1938), rev'd on other grounds,
135 Ohio St. 187, 20 N.E.2d 229 (1939); Commonwealth v. Visocki, 23 Pa. D. & C. 103
(1935); Commonwealth v. Zammarelli, 17 Pa. D. & C. 229 (1931).
6. E.g., Sioux City & P.R.R. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745 (U.S. 1873).
7. 74 Cal. App. 2d 652, 169 P.2d 442 (1946), criticized in Notes, 2 ARK. L. REv. 133
(1948), 4 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 199 (1947).
8. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1978 (1946).
9. 10 Cal. 2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043, 115 A.L.R. 163 (1937).
10. MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAws, art. 12, § 17 (Cum. Supp. 1947); N.J. STAT. ANN.
88 2:99-3, 2:99-4 (Cum. Supp. 1949); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 126-a; N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 49-7 (Cum. Supp. 1947); Onio CODE ANN. §§ 12122-1, 12122-2 (Supp.
1949); Wis. STAT. § 166.105 (1947).
11. State v. Brigham, 33 N.W.2d 285 (S.D. 1948).
12. Commonwealth v. Morris, 22 Pa. D. & C. 111 (1934). It is necessary, of course,
in order to administer a blood-grouping test that the blood of the mother as well as
that of the child and the alleged father be tested.
13. Bednarik v. Bednarik, 18 N.J. Misc. 633, 16 A.2d 80 (Ch. 1940).
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to the tests. 14 The problem of constitutional rights is another barrier confront-
ing the courts.15 But at least one court has declared, in spite of these problems,
that it has inherent power, even in the absence of a statute, to order the tests' 16
In many other fields scientific discoveries ahd theories have been
recognized as having a high probative value.'7 The reasoning in the instant
case night well be applied in some of these fields. When the results of a test
are accepted by scientists as being conclusive scientific facts, and such scientific
evidence is neither contradicted nor impeached, the trial court should at least
set aside a verdict contrary to such evidence. If it would not be an invasion of.
the province of the jury to do this, it would also seem that the trial court could
direct a verdict upon the strength of such evidence. To safeguard the interests
of the parties involved, the court could appoint experts to conduct the tests.
Of course, if the results might vary or be incorrect, as sometimes occurs in
the case of truth serums or lie detectors, the test has no value as evidence.' 8
The instant case is a step forward. Every day science affirms its faith
in the correctness of the blood-grouping theory by making thousands of blood
transfusions-where the very life of the patient is at stake. The defendant in
a bastardy action may lose his freedom; the petitioner in a divorce case may
find himself compelled to support a child not his own. Proving innocence in
the one case, or adultery in the other, is a very difficult problem. The woman
involved is often the only person in possession of all the facts, and she is
unlikely to reveal them. By making the results of the blood-grouping tests
conclusive, the law may prevent the adventuress from picking at random the
father of her child, and the adulteress from hiding behind her marriage with
immunity.
INCOME TAXATION-SALE OF CORPORATE ASSETS-
DETERMINATION OF WHETHER SALE WAS MADE
BY CORPORATION OR SHAREHOLDER
The shareholders of petitioner, a closely-held public service corporation,
realizing the corporation could not compete with a newly-established TVA
14. Commonwealth v. Krutsick, 151 Pa. Super. 164, 30 A.2d 325, 326 (1943). The
court stated that "the putative father would have everything to gain and nothing to
lose. . . , while the mother would have everything to lose and nothing to gain [by the
tests]."
15. Commonwealth v. English, 123 Pa. Super. 161, 186 Atl. 298 (1936).
16. State v. Damm, 64 S.D. 309, 266 N.W. 667 (1936), see Note, 9 Miss. L.J. 234,
235, 239 (1936).
17. E.g., Hornsby v. Commonwealth, 263 Ky. 613, 92 S.W.2d 773 (1936) (finger-
prints); Evans v. Commonwealth, 230 Ky. 411, 19 S.W.2d 1091 (1929) (ballistics);
People v. Morse, 325 Mich. 270, 38 N.W.2d 322 (1949), 3 VAND. L. REv. 318 (1950)
(Harger Drunkometer); State v. Smith, 128 Ore. 515, 273 Pac. 323 (1929) (photo-
graphs); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Dicken, 80 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935)
(X-rays).
18. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (2d ed. 1948); Despres,
Legal Aspects of Drug-Induced Statements, 14 U. OF CHI. L. RV. 601 (1947).
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cooperative, offered to sell all the corporate stock to the cooperative. The co-
operative refused to buy the stock, but countered with an offer to buy direct-
ly from the cbrporation its transmission and distribution equipment. The
corporation rejected the offer because a sale by it would have involved a
heavy capital gains tax. The shareholders then proposed that they acquire the
equipment from the corporation and sell it to the cooperative. The cooperative
accepted. After a transfer of the equipment from the corporation to the
shareholders in partial liquidation, the remaining assets were sold and the
corporation dissolved. The shareholders then completed the transaction. The
Commissioner assessed a capital gains tax against petitioner on the theory that
the shareholders had been used as a mere conduit for effectuating what was
really a corporate sale. The Court of Claims found that, although the method
of sale was avowedly chosen in order to reduce taxes, the sale itself was made
not by the corporation but by the stockholders. Held, affirmed. The findings
sustained the conclusion that the sale was made by stockholders rather than
the corporation. United States v. Cumberland Public Service Co., 70 Sup.
Ct. 280 (U.S. 1950).
When a corporation consummates a sale of its assets, any gain realized
on the sale is taxable to the corporation; I and if the proceeds are then dis-
tributed, the stockholders may have to pay a second tax on the same profit.2
But if the corporation first distributes the assets to its stockholders, either
in partial or complete liquidation, and the -stockholders thereafter sell the
property, the tax on the corporation is avoided.3 Where the corporation is
closely held, the distinction between sales by the corporation and sales by
the stockholders after distribution may be "particularly shadowy and arti-
ficial." 4
It is a familiar principle of American law that a taxpayer may decrease
the amount of his income tax or avoid the tax altogether by any means which
the law permits, and his motive in no way changes the result.5 But the trans-
action will be carefully scrutinized where such motive is shown, to determine
whether it is a mere sham or subterfuge rather than what it purports to be
in form; 6 and in the sale of corporate assets, although the transaction is car-
1. 26 U.S.C.A. § 22(a) (1948); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22 (a)-18.
2. E.g., if the amount received by the shareholder in distribution or liquidation
exceeds the cost basis of his stock, he will be liable for a capital gains tax. On the
other hand, if the direct transfer of the property by the corporation involves a loss,
there may be a double deduction: the deduction of the loss to the corporation, and
the deduction of the loss to the stockholder on liquidation.
3. General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 200, 56 Sup. Ct. 185,
80 L. Ed. 154 (1935); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-20.
4. 70 Sup. Ct. at 282 (1950).
5. E.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469, 55 Sup. Ct. 266, 79 L. Ed. 596
(1935); United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F.2d 17, 20 (6th Cir. 1948).
6. E.g., Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 335-37, 60 Sup. Ct. 554, 84 L. Ed.
788 (1940); United States v. Phellis, 257 U.S. 156, 168, 42 Sup. Ct. 63, 64 L. Ed.
180 (1921). See Note, 101 A.L.R. 204, 208 (1936).
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ried out in two steps, with legal title passing through the stockholders, if it is
a unitary plan to dispose of appreciated corporate assets, the courts may
disregard the form for tax purposes.7
Whether a transaction under scrutiny is in reality what it appears to be
in form is primarily a question of fact, and distribution-and-sale cases neces-
sarily involve such factual disputes.8 In this regard, the problem is no different
from any other question of fact, and the findings of fact of the trial court
will not be disturbed so long as supported by substantial evidence. 9 According-
ly, it is impossible to predict with certainty the outcome of a particular
case, for the trier of fact may reach opposite conclusions in two cases with
very similar evidentiary facts.10
There are, however, certain basic considerations for the determination of
this factual question. In determining who actually made the sale," or on whose
behalf the sale was made, it may be important whether the corporation itself
at any time made plans to sell; 1 whether the corporation initiated the ne-
gotiations for the sale; 12 and whether the terms of the sale are substantially
the same as the terms in the preliminary negotiations.'" The extent of pre-
sale negotiations between the corporation and the purchaser is always im-
portant and may be controlling.14
The cases agree that the corporation may be held taxable on a sale of
its property by the stockholders after liquidation if the facts indicate that the
shareholders in making the sale have acted as nominees or agents of the
corporation; 15 or that the property was transferred to trustees who later
7. Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 513, 516 (10th Cir. 1947) ;
S.A. MacQueen Co. v. Comm'r, 67 F.2d 857, 858 (3d Cir. 1933); Guinness v. United
States, 73 F. Supp. 119, 131 (Ct. Cl. 1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 819 (1948), 48 CoL.
L. REv. 810; cf. Comm'r v. Transport Trading & Terminal Corp., 176 F.2d 570
(2d Cir. 1949) (doctrine of Gregory v. Helvering, supra note 5, invoked to hold
corporation taxable). But see PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES -I1 FEDERAL TAXATION 200-04
(2d ser. 1938), where it is said that such attempts to distinguish form and substance
have been discouragingly unsuccessful and misleading.
8. See, e.g., Wichita Terminal Elevator Co. v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 513, 515 (10th
Cir. 1947); James Duggan, 18 B.T.A. 608, 625 (1930).
9. Comm'r v. Scottish American Co., 323 U.S. 119, 123, 65 Sup. Ct. 169, 89
L. Ed. 113 (1944); Dobson v. Comm'r, 320 U.S. 489, 64 Sup. Ct. 239, 88 L. Ed. 248
(1943). See 26 U.S.C.A. § 1141(a) (1948).
10. Eg., John Kelley Co. v. Comm'r, 326 U.S. 521, 66 Sup. Ct. 299, 90 L. Ed.
278 (1946).
11. See United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F.2d 17, 21 (6th Cir.
1948); George S. Towne, 35 B.T.A. 141, 150 (1936); Nace Realty Co., 28 B.T.A.
467, 470 (1933).
12. See Kaufmann v. Comm'r, 175 F.2d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1949); Fairfield Steam-
ship Corp. v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 774 (1946).
13. See Embry Realty Co. v. Glenn, 116 F.2d 682, 683, (6th Cir. 1940); Hattie
W. Mackay, 29 B.T.A. 1090, 1094 (1934).
14. Kaufmann v. Comm'r, 175 F.2d 28 (3d Cir. 1949), affirming 11 T.C. 483 (1948),
22 So. CALIF. L. REV. 216 (1949), 35 VA. L. REV. 270 (1949); Howell Turpentine Co.
v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1947), 1 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 106 (1948);
Fairfield Steamship Corp. v. Comm'r, 157 F.2d 321, 322 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied.
329 U.S. 774 (1946), 56 YALE L.J. 379 (1947); Conservative Gas Co., 30 B.T.A. 552,
555 (1934). But cf. Robert Jemison, Jr., 3 B.T.A. 780, 802 (1926).
15. Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
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sold, apparently in behalf of the stockholders, but in fact as agents of the
corporation in liquidation.16 Where the corporation in prior negotiations com-
mits itself, legally or morally,17 to sell specific assets which are then trans-
ferred to its stockholders who consummate the transaction, the courts will
hold the corporation taxable on the ground that the stockholders are merely
conduits of title.'
8
But where the courts have found that the corporation itself was not
obligated to make the sale,19 and that there were no substantial corporate
negotiations prior to the liquidation, 20 they have attributed no taxable gain to
the corporation. It is clear that the shareholders may contract to sell the prop-
erty they expect to receive in liquidation without subjecting the corporation
to taxation.
21
The problem was passed upon by the Supreme Court for the first time
in Comnmissiower v. Court Holding Company. 22 There the Court reaffirmed
the proposition that the incidence of taxation depends, not on. the means em-
ployed to transfer legal title, but on the substance of the transaction, which
is to be viewed as a whole from the commencement of negotiations to the
consummation of the sale, and every step of the transaction is relevant for
this purpose. In that case, the corporation having learned of the high taxes
involved, withdrew from an oral agreement to sell its real property, then
transferred the property in liquidation to its two shareholders, who com-
pleted the sale on terms identical with the previous oral agreement. The Court
held the corporation taxable, emphasizing that realistically viewed the sale
was made before the liquidation of the corporation.
324 U.S. 860 (1945); Trippett v. Comm'r, 118 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1941), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 644 (1941); Embry Realty Co. v. Glenn, 116 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1940);
S.A. MacQueen Co. v. Comm'r, 67 F.2d 857 (3d Cir. 1933); Nace Realty Co., 28
B.T.A. 467 (1933); James Duggan, 18 B.T.A. 608 (1930).
16. First National Bank v. United States, 86 F.2d 938 (10th Cir. 1936); Tazewell
Electric Light & Power Co. v. Strother, 84 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1936) ; Hellebush v.
Comm'r, 65 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1933); Burnet v. Lexington Ice & Coal Co., 62 F.2d
906 (4th Cir. 1933); Taylor Oil & Gas Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1931),
cert. denied, 283 U.S. 862 (1931); Chilhowee Mills, Inc., 4 T.C. 558 (1945). See
U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-20, which provides that any sale of property made
by a trustee or receiver in dissolution while winding up a corporation's affairs shall
be treated as if made by the corporation.
17. Comm'r v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331, 334, 65 Sup. Ct. 707, 89 L. Ed.
981 (1945).
18. Meurer Steel Barrel Co. v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 282, 284 (3d Cir. 1944), cert.
dended, 324 U.S. 860 (1945); Nace Realty Co., 28 B.T.A. 467, 470 (1933); James
Duggan, 18 B.T.A. 608, 626-27 (1930).
19. See Comm'r v. Falcon Co., 127 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1942).
20. See United States v. Cummins Distilleries Corp., 166 F.2d 17, 21 (6th Cir.
1948); Ripy Brothers Distillers, Inc., 11 T.C. 326, 339 (1948); Acampo Winery
and Distilleries, Inc., 7 T.C. 629, 635 (1946); Conservative Gas Co., 30 B.T.A. 552,
555 (1934); Fruit Belt Telephone Co., 22 B.T.A. 440, 441 (1931).
21. Howell Turpentine Co. v. Comm'r, 162 F.2d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 1947); Baum v.
Dallman, 76 F. Supp. 410, 414 (S.D. Ill. 1948); Cooper Foundation, 7 T.C. 389,
395 (1946); George T. Williams, 3 T.C. 1002, 1011-12 (1944).
22. 324 U.S. 331, 65 Sup. Ct. 707, 89 L. Ed. 981 (1945). The problem was
presented but not passed upon in General Utilities & Operating Co. v. Helvering,
296 U.S. 200, 56 Sup. Ct. 185, 80 L. Ed. 154 (1935).
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Just as the Court Holding Company case clearly emphasizes substance,
the instant case may, at first glance, seem to emphasize the form of the trans-
action. But the instant case should not be construed to give any comfort to
the tax evader, for the factual situations of the two cases are clearly dis-
tinguishable, the facts here indicating a bona fide sale by the stockholders, and
the holding specifically affirming the earlier well-settled rules of tax law.
The instant case cannot, of course, give absolute certainty to the settle-
ment of this difficult factual question; 23 and though the application of the
law to particular cases is uncertain, such uncertainty is not always a vice.
It may indeed be desirable where certainty in the rule8 would afford oppor-
tunities for avoidance through transactions that are not substantially dis-
tinguishable in fact.24 Where this uncertainty does exist, the taxpayer should
bear in mind that his transaction may eventually face a fact-finding body.
and the only safe approach is to stay as far from the dividing line as pos-
sible.
INSURANCE-WAIVER OF PREMIUMS-INSANITY AS EXCUSE
FOR FAILURE TO NOTIFY INSURER OF DISABILITY
The life insurance policy under which plaintiff was beneficiary pro-
vided that if the insured should become totally disabled and proof thereof
were furnished the insurer while no premium was in default, further pre-
miums would be waived. Insfired became disabled because of insanity, and the
policy lapsed before notice of the disability was given. Upon the death of the
insured plaintiff sued the insurer. Held, judgment for plaintiff affirmed. The
insanity of the insured excused the failure to furnish'notice as required by the
terms of the policy. Limp us v. New York Life Ins. Co., 226 S.W.2d 97, (Mo.
App. 1949).
A condition in a contract, if it is not an essential part of the exchange,
may be excused by a supervening impossibility.' Thus, when notice of a loss
insured against is required within a specified period of time, as in the case of
an accident or health insurance policy, the failure to comply with the con-
dition is generally excused by mental incapacity of an insured after injury.2
23. But see Guttdn and Beck, Sale of Assets Received on Liquidation, 28 TAXES
328 (1950), where it is said that the instant case, by replacing the "conduit" theory
with a rule of law that looks to the realities of the situation, goes far to crystallize
the standards to be applied in such a case and to eliminate doubts arising out of the
Court Holding Company case.
24. See Bowe, Life Insurance, The Forbidden Fruit, 2 VAND. L. REv. 212, 227
(1949). But see Magill, Sales of Corporate Stock or Assets, 47 COL. L. REv. 707, 721
(1947).
1. RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAcTS § 301 (1932); Corbin, Supervening Impossibility of
Performing Conditions Precedent, 22 COL. L. REv. 421 (1922).
2. Continental Casualty Co. v. Matthis, 150 Ky. 477, 150 S.W. 507 (1912); Reed
v. Loyal Protective Ass'n, 154 Mich. 161, 117 N.W. 600 (1908); Roseberry v. Amer-
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Similar to compensations made under these policies are benefit payments dur-
ing disability of an insured under a life insurance policy in which such pay-
ments are provided. A waiver-of-premiums clause is an alternative method of
making premium payments which indirectly confers a benefit on the insured
in that it relieves him of the necessity of remitting further premiums. These
features of a life insurance policy are conditioned upon notice being fur-
nished the insurer of the disability of the insured. And by analogy to the
accident and health insurance cases, the majority of courts, apparently em-
phasizing the disability feature, hold that impossibility to comply with the
terms of the policy because of insanity excuses the failure to notify the in-
surer.3
Although the courts are uniformly influenced by the harshness of a rule
which. would allow an insurer to avoid a policy when the very disability the
insured must prove in order to have his premium payments excused renders
such proof impossible, 4 the reasons assigned in support of this view are not
harmonious and are often inconclusive. The difficulty encountered is the gen-
eral rule of contract law that the expressed intent of the parties is con-
trolling.5 In order to circumvent this substantive rule, some courts have labeled
the requirement of notice a condition subsequent.0 Other courts hold that
the clause is ambiguous and construe it to mean that the occurrence of dis-
ability is a condition precedent to the insurer's liability and the requirement of
notice merely a prerequisite to recovery on the policy.7 Still other courts have
judicially written an exception into the policy on the ground that it could not
have been within the contemplation of the parties that a condition which the
ican Benevolent Ass'n, 142 Mo. App. 552, 121 S.W. 785 (1909); 7 CooLEY, BRIEFS ON
INSURANCE 5918 (2d ed. 1928) ; VANCE, INSURANCF 788 (2d ed. 1930). Contra: White-
side v. North American Accident Ins. Co., 200 N.Y. 320, 93 N.E. 948, 35 L.R.A.
(N.s.) 696 (1911).
3. For a collection of cases, see Bennett v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 173 Ore.
386, 145 P.2d 815 (1944); Notes, 142 A.L.R. 852 (1942), 59 A.L.R. 1080 (1929),
54 A.L.R. 611 (1928). But cf. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AN PRACTICE § 8317
(1944) ; Note, 4 Jon MARSHALL L.Q. 234 (1938).
4. For example, see the language in Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Heilbronner, 116
F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 707 (1941); McCoy v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 219 Iowa 514, 258 N.W. 320 (1935); Whetstone v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 182 S.C. 150, 188 S.E. 793 (1936); Swann v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 156 Va. 852,
159 S.E. 192 (1931).
5. 6 WILLISTON\, CoNTRAcrs § 1931 (Rev. ed. 1938).
6. Pfeiffer v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 174 Ark. 783, 297 S.W. 847, 54 A.L.R.
600 (1927); Levan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 138 S.C. 253, 136 S.E. 304 (1927).
The term is used in these cases as being analogous to a condition subsequent in
property law, rather than in its ordinary meaning in contract law, where an existing
legal duty is extinguished upon the happening of a subsequent event. VANCE, INSURANCE
§ 46 (2d ed. 1930). In effect it is a condition subsequent to loss or a post-causal
condition. Patterson, Supervening Impossibility of Performing Conditions in Insurance
Policies, 22 COL. L. REv. 613, 625 (1922). For a discussion of the misuse of terminology
in regard to conditions in insurance contracts, see Hartnett & Thornton, The hisurance
Condition Subsequent: A Needle in A Semantic Haystack, 17 FoRi. L. REv. 220 (1948).
7. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 29 F.2d 977 (8th Cir. 1928);
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. Tharpe, 130 Fla. 546, 178 So. 300 (1938). Frequently men-
tioned in these cases, as well as others which support the majority rule, is the principle
that the law abhors a forfeiture.
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insured could not perform because of his disability should avoid the policy.8
A substantial number of courts, however, insist upon a literal interpreta-
tion of the waiver-of-premiums clause and hold that the requirement of no-
tice is a material part of the contract which cannot be excused by impossibil-
ity.9 These courts so hold on the grounds that the waiver of premiums is
analogous to the payment of premiums which cannot be excused by impos-
sibility 10 and that the very purpose of the provision is to measure the bounds
of the insurer's liability." Also, the fact that someone other than the insured
could have supplied the notice has frequently influenced these courts in reach-
ing this result.12 This latter reason was the precise argument of the de-
fendant in the instant case. The court, however, refused to. so restrict the
majority rule, previously affirmed in Missouri,13 on the ground that an insane
insured might be incapable of securing another to furnish notice of his con-
dition.'
4
Ultimately, the rule which excuses the failure of an insane insured to
comply with the express terms of the insurance contract is one of general
policy. It is apparent in the cases upholding the excuse that the courts were
more interested in finding legal methods for reaching a desired result than
they were compelled by logical reasoning and legal interpretation tc attain
that result.'5
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF COUNTY
FOR INJURY TO HIGH SCHOOL FOOTBALL SPECTATOR
Plaintiff paid an admission fee to witness a high school football game
and was injured when the bleachers collapsed. He sued the County and
County Board of Education, alleging that the bleachers were negligently
8. Marti v. Midwest Life Ins. Co., 108 Neb. 845, 189 N.W. 388 (1922); Rhyne
v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 196 N.C. 717, 147 S.E. 6 (1929); Whetstone v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 182 S.C. 150, 188 S.E. 793 (1936); Texas Life Ins. Co.
v. Sharp, 159 S.W.2d 951 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Schlintz v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc., 226 Wis. 255, 276 N.W. 336 (1937).
9. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 217 Ala. 307, 116 So. 151 (1928);
Sherman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 Mass. 330, 8 N.E.2d 892 (1937); Pacific
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 168 Tenn. 690, 80 S.W.2d 662 (1935); Note, 142 A.L.R.
852, 856 (1942).
10. Brown v. New York Life Ins. Co., 54 Ga. App. 471, 188 S.E. 293 (1936);
Smith v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 134 Kan. 426, 7 P.2d 65 (1932); Iannarelli
v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 114 W. Va. 88, 171 S.E. 748 (1933).
11. Sherman v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 297 Mass. 330, 8 N.E.2d 892 (1937);
Berry v. Lamar Life Ins. Co., 165 Miss. 405, 142 So. 445 (1932).
12. Egan v. New York Life Ins. Co., 65 F.2d 899 (5th Cir- 1933); Pacific Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 168 Tenn. 690, 80 S.W.2d 662 (1935).
13. Shoen v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 167 S.W.2d 423 (Mo. App. 1943), aff'd,
180 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. 1944).
14. 226 S.W.2d at 101.
15. A Virginia court thus aptly stated, in summarizing its reasons for the rule,
"It should be remembered that, if the letter killeth, the spirit giveth life." Swann v.
Atlantic Life Ins. Co., 156 Va. 852, 159 S.E. 192, 195 (1931).
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constructed. A default judgment against the Board was entered, but a
demurrer by the County was sustained on the ground that it was engaged
in a governmental function and hence could not be held liable for the
negligence of its officials and employees. From a subsequent order dismissing
the action as to both defendants, plaintiff appeals. Held, affirmed. In the
operation of a school system a Board of Education is engaging in a govern-
mental function conferring immunity from tort liability.' Reed v. Rhea
County, 225 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1949).
It is elementary that the federal and state governments are, in the
absence of statute, immune from tort liability.2 In regard to torts committed
by local governmental units, however, two distinct common law doctrines
have been developed by the courts.3 Municipal corporations, such as voluntarily
organized cities, are liable in tort while acting in a proprietary, as distinguished
from a governmental, capacity. 4 Quasi-corporations such as counties, school
boards and school districts, on the other hand, generally enjoy the immunity
of the state and are liable in tort only if a statute so provides.5 This immunity
hds been predicated primarily upon the ground that these governmental entities
are involuntary statutory associations constituting mere agencies through
which state functions are exercised.6 Some states, however, have modified
this doctrine by statute,7 while others have refused to recognize judicially a
1. Although plaintiff assigned as error the sustaining of the demurrer as to Rhea
County, it was stated in his brief on appeal that "the judge was correct in dismissing
the suit as to Rhea County as the Board of Education is a separate and distinct entity
from the County and suit must be filed against the School Board and not against the
County for any claim they might have." 225 S.W.2d at 50.
2. The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 159, 66 L. Ed. 299 (1922);
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 27 Sup. Ct. 526, 51 L. Ed. 834 (1907);
Langford v. United States, 101 U.S. 341, 25 L. Ed. 1010 (1879); Railroad Co. v.
Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337, 25 L. Ed. 960 (1879). See Borchard, Governmental Liability
in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924) ; Barry, The King Can Do No W~rong, 11 VA. L. REV.
349 (1925).
3. For a general discussion of the rules of responsibility for tort in the United
States see Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Com-
parative Survey, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoD. 181, 187 (1942).
4. E.g., Carta v. Norwalk, 108 Conn. 697, 145 Ati. 158 (1929); City of Hazard v.
Duff, 287 Ky. 427, 154 S.W.2d 28 (1941); Bailey v. The Mayor of New York, 3 Hill
531, 38 Am. Dec. 669. (N.Y. 1842) ; Ostron v. San Antonio, 94 Tex. 523, 62 S.W. 909
(1901). This is the rule in every state except South Carolina. Looper v. Easley, 172
S.C. 11, 172 S.E. 705 (1934). See generally Repko, American Legal Commentary on
the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. Pnoa. 214 (1942);
Barnett, The Fowndations of the Distinction between Public and Private Functions, 16
ORE. L. REV. 250 (1937); Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporatiohls, 4 ILL.
L.Q. 28 (1921); Note, 28 GEo. L.J. 526 (1940).
5. School Dist. v. Rivera, 30 Ariz. 1, 243 Pac. 609 (1926); Berrien County v.
Vickers, 73 Ga. App. 863, 38 S.E.2d 619 (1946); Carr v. Jefferson County, 275 Ky.
685, 122 S.W.2d 482 (1938); Perkins v. Trask, 95 Mont. 1, 23 P.2d 982 (1933);
6 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL. CORPORATIONS § 2775 (2d ed. 1936); Borchard, Govern-
ment Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1, 41 (1924) ; 20 C.J.S., Counties § 215 (1940).
6. Stanton v. Morgan, 127 Fla. 34, 172 So. 485 (1937); O'Brien v. Rockingham
County, 80 N.H. 522, 120 AtI. 254 (1923) ; Meliodon v. School Dist., 328 Pa. 457, 195
Ati. 905 (1938); Fry v. Albemarle County, 86 Va. 195, 9 S.E. 1004 (1889).
7. CAL. EDUc. CODE § 1008 (1944); CAL. GEN. LAWS act 5619, § 2 (1944); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 95-1001 (1937); WASH. CODE § 471-1 (Pierce, 1943); WIs. STAT.
§§ 101.01, 101.06 (1947).
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distinction between municipal and quasi-corporations in this regard, holding
that counties can act in a proprietary capacity and allowing recovery accord-
ingly.8 But since the operation of a school system is generally deemed to be
a governmental function, even in the latter-mentioned states, no liability
attaches for injuries received by a participant in school activities.9
The apparent rule in Tennessee is that governmental bodies, other than
municipal corporations,' ° are incapable of acting in a proprietary capacity and
thus come within the governmental immunity of the state. As in the instant
case, the courts have inferentially supported the proposition that a county or
a county agency might act in a proprietary capacity by expressly stating that
the particular function engaged in at the time of the alleged tort was "govern-
mental." 11 But recovery has never been allowed where negligence of a county
was the allegation, and in many cases it has been unequivocally stated that,
in the absence of a statute, a county is not liable for torts committed by its
agents. 12 At one time it was recognized that a county could act in a private
capacity in the commission of a nuisance and could be held liable for damages. 13
Recently, however, the courts have usually found that the nuisance was
committed while the county was acting in a governmental capacity,14 and
the earlier doctrine seems to have been overruled. 15
In the instant case an effort was made to secure an application by the
court of the municipal-corporation doctrine to the Board of Education. In
Tennessee, such a board has statutory authority to act in its own behalf in
8. Henderson v. Twin Falls County, 56 Idaho 124, 50 P.2d 597, 101 A.L.R. 1151
(1935); Hannon v. St. Louis County, 62 Mo. 313 (1876); Jacoby v. Chouteau County,
112 Mont. 70, 112 P.2d 1068 (1941); Bell v. Pittsburgh, 297 Pa. 185, 146 Atl. 567,
64 A.L.R. 1542 (1929).
9. Rhoades v. School Dist., 115 Mont. 352, 142 P.2d 890 (1943); Carlo v. School
Dist., 319 Pa. 417, 179 Atl. 561 (1935). See Rosenfield, Governmental Immunity from
Tort in School Accidents, 5 LEGAL NoTEs ON LOCAL GoV'T 358 (1940); Note, 160
A.L.R. 7 (1946).
10. For examples of the application of the municipal corporation doctrine in Ten-
nessee, see Nashville v. Mason, 137 Tenn. 169, 192 S.W. 915 (1916); Saulman v. Nash-
ville, 131 Tenn. 427, 175 S.W. 532 (1914); Irvins v. Chattanooga, 101 Tenn. 291, 47
S.W. 419 (1898); Nashville v. Fox, 6 Tenn. App. 653 (M.S. 1928).
11. Hamilton County v. Bryant, 175 Tenn. 123, 132 S.W.2d 639 (1939); Lee v.
Davidson County, 158 Tenn. 313, 13 S.W.2d 328 (1929); McAndrews v. Hamilton
County, 105 Tenn. 399, 58 S.W. 483 (1900) ; Armitage v. Holt, 21 Tenn. App. 273, 109
S.W.2d 411 (E.S. 1937).
12. Burnett v. Maloney, 97 Tenn. 697, 37 S.W. 689 (1896); White's Creek Turn-
pike Co. v. Davidson County, 82 Tenn. 73 (1884); Wood v. Tipton County, 66 Tenn.
112, 32 Am. Rep. 561 (1874) ; Weakley County v. Carney, 14 Tenn. App. 688 (W.S. 1932).
13. Chandler v. Davidson County, 142 Tenn. 265, 218 S.W. 222 (1919).
14. Odil v. Maury County, 175 Tenn. 550, 136 S.W.2d 500 (1940); Vance v. Shelby
County, 152 Tenn. 141, 273 S.W. 557 (1925); Carothers v. Shelby County, 148 Tenn.
185, 253 S.W. 708 (1922).
15. Buckholtz v. Hamilton County, 180 Tenn. 263, 174 S.W.2d 455 (1943), over-
ruling Chandler v. Davidson County, 142 Tenn. 265, 218 S.W. 222 (1919); see Unicoi
County v. Barnett, 181 Tenn. 565, 567, 182 S.W2d 865 (1944) ; Note, 20 TENN. L. REv.
619 (1949).
16. That a County Board of Education can contract in its own name, see Benson
v. Hardin County, 173 Tenn. 246, 116 S.W.2d 1025 (1938); Morton v. Hancock County,
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certain matters, 16 but it is ordinarily considered as a mere agent of the
county and its members as county officers.17
The single exception to the absolute immunity rule in Tennessee appears
in those cases where a county or its agency is indemnified by insurance against
the specific claim of an injured plaintiff.'8 This is apparently the rule regard-
less of whether or not the insurance is specifically provided for by statute.
19
The exception is perhaps illustrative of the attitude of the courts toward
the non-responsibility doctrine, for a recovery upon an insurance policy
implies the existence of legal liability. But further judicial relaxation of the
immunity doctrine seems unlikely. The court in the instant case indicated this
by stating that although the reasons given to support the immunity doctrine 
2 0
may seem unjust and inequitable, any further change in the rule must be
effected through legislative enactment rather than by judicial decision.
2 '
An injury negligently inflicted upon an individual by a county through
its agents demands a remedy as much as an injury so inflicted by a private
corporation or an individual. The Federal Government has waived its im-
munity by statute,22 as have many of the states.23 The ancient theory of
sovereign immunity-"The king can do no wrong"-has lost its significance
161 Tenn. 324, 30 S.W.2d 250 (1930). That a County Board of Education has power
to locate schools, see Walker v. Monger, 6 Tenn. Civ. App. 261 (1915).
17. Keese v. Hamilton County, 184 Tenn. 171, 197 S.W.2d 800 (1946) ; Boswell v.
Powell, 163 Tenn. 445, 43 S.W.2d 495 (1931) ; State ex rel. Boles v. Groce, 152 Tenn.
566, 280 S.W. 27 (1925); State ex rel. Milligan v. Jones, 143 Tenn. 575, 224 S.W.
1041 (1920).
18. Rogers v. Butler, 170 Tenn. 125, 92 S.W.2d 414 (1936); Marion County v.
Cantrell, 166 Tenn. 358, 61 S.W.2d 477 (1932) ; Taylor v. Cobble, 28 Tenn. App. 167,
187 S.W.2d 648 (E.S. 1945); cf. 1 VAND. L. REv. 470, 472 (1948).
19. In Taylor v. Cobble and Rogers v. Butler, supra note 18, the court justified
its holding by TENN. CODE ANN. § 2495 (Williams 1934), which gives a county board
power to provide transportation for school children, and to require the driver of any
vehicle to make bond for the faithful performance of these duties. Expenditures for
insurance premiums were held to be within this power. But in Marion County v. Can-
trell, supra note 18, the court made no effort to find statutory authority for the insurance
policy held by the county and allowed the county to waive its immunity.
20. "One reason given as to why a governmental entity is not liable in a private
action for negligence in the performance of its duties while acting in a governmental
capacity is that such entity 'has no funds out of which satisfaction for damage thus
inflicted can be had.' This reason is justified upon the theory that 'it is better that an
individual should suffer than the public should sustain an inconvenience.'" 225 S.W.2d
at 51.
21. 225 S.W.2d at 51.
22. Federal Tort Claims Act, 60 STAT. 842, 28 U.S.C.A. § 921 (Supp. 1946). Gott-
lieb, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Statutory Interpretation, 35 GEo. L.J. 1 (1946)
Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 26 N.C. L. REv. 119 (1948). See Notes, 42 ILL. L. Rv.
344 (1947), 20 Miss. L.J. 354 (1949), 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947).
23. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 37, § 439 (1945) ; Micn. STAT. ANN. §§ 27.3548(1)-27.3548
(41) (Reis Ann. Supp. 1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 1143-1147(21) (1949). For a
general discussion of the various statutory provisions authorizing suits or claims against
the state, see Nutting, Legislative Practice Regarding Tort Claims against the State,
4 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1939). In Tennessee, a statute provides for a board of claims vested
with power to hear and determine, among others, all claims for personal injuries or
property damages caused by negligence in the construction and maintenance of state
highways or other state properties, and by negligence of any state official or employee
in the operation of any state-owned vehicle or other equipment. TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 103426 et seq. (Williams Supp. 1948).
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in our society, for governmental bodies can and do cause actual damage, a fact
which is increasingly evident as governmental activities at all levels become
more extensive.
TAX TITLES-BILL BY ORIGINAL OWNER TO QUIET TITLE-REQUIRE-
MENT THAT HE REIMBURSE PURCHASER AS CONDITION TO RELIEF
At a tax sale defendant bought land b6longing to plaintiff. As the tax
involved bad been assessed by the county, while authority to levy it was in the
state, the plaintiff claimed that the tax was void and brought suit to quiet
title. Defendant claimed reimbursement as a condition to equitable relief. Held
(3-2), reimbursement is required. Crystal Lime & Cement Company v. Rob-
bins, 209 P.2d 739 (Utah 1949).
A person seeking to cancel an invalid tax title by a bill to quiet title or
to remove cloud on title is seeking equitable relief. Applying the maxim, "he
who seeks equity must do equity," a number of courts have required the
complainant to reimburse the tax title holder in the amount of the tax.1 But
the question of whether reimbursement is required really depends upon
whether the complainant has received a benefit to which he is not justly en-
titled. Thus, principles of restitution become relevant.2 If the true owner has
paid the tax, payment by the tax title claimant is of no benefit to him; 3 like-
wise, if the tax is void there was no obligation upon the owner and a later pay-
ment is consequently of no benefit to him.4 But if the tax title fails because
of an irregularity in the tax sale, the true owner has been benefited by the ex-
tinguishment of the tax and should make restitution.5 If there is an irregular-
1. Gage v. Pumpelly, 115 U.S. 454, 4 Sup. Ct. 136, 29 L. Ed. 449 (1885) ; Fordyce
v. Vickers, 99 Ark. 500, 138 S.W. 1010 (1911); Holland v. Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366,
123 Pac. 258 (1912); Evans v. Poppie, 51 Idaho 123, 4 P.2d 356 (1931); Willard v.
Ames, 130 Ind. 351, 30 N.E. 210 (1892); Buck v. Holt, 74 Iowa 294, 37 N.W. 377
(1888); Hart v. Wiley, 130 Kan. 26, 285 Pac. 548 (1930); Closser v. Hanson Land
Co., 209 Mich. 517, 177 N.W. 196 (1920) ; Bloomstein v. Brien, 3 Tenn. Ch. 55 (1875) ;
Oregon Short Line R.R. v. Hallock, 41 Utah 378, 126 Pac. 394 (1912). See Notes,
86 A.L.R. 1208 (1933), L.R.A. 1915C 492.
2. If the present defendant had brought a legal action in restitution to recover the
amount paid, it is likely that relief would have been denied on the ground that the
mistake was one of law rather than of fact. But as the action was brought in equity
by the original owners the fact that the benefit was obtained by a mistake of law does
not seem to be controlling. Even at law it has been held that restitution may be had
for mistake of law when a set-off is possible. See Hemphill v. Moody, 64 Ala. 468
(1879) ; Carley v. Lewis, 24 Ind. 23 (1865) ; Livesey v. Livesey, 3 Russ. 287, 38 Eng.
Rep. 583 (Ch. 1927).
3. Gage v. Kaufman, 133 U.S. 471, 10 Sup. Ct. 406, '33 L. Ed. 725 (1890) ; Glos
v. Shedd, 218 I1. 209, 75 N.E. 887 (1905); Kent v. Auditor General, 138 Mich. 605,
101 N.W. 805 (1904); see also, Note, 26 A.L.R. 622 (1923).
4. Garrett Biblical Institute v. Elmhurst State Bank, 331 Ill. 308, 163 N.E. 1
(1928); State Finance Co. v. Myers, 16 N.D. 193, 112 N.W. 76 (1907); Title Trust
Co. v. Aylsworth, 40 Ore. 20, 66 Pac. 276 (1901) ; 4 CooLEY, TAxATION § 1505 (4th ed.,
Nichols, 1924).
5. Holland v. Hotchkiss, 162 Cal. 366, 123 Pac. 258 (1912).
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ity in the assessment, a question then arises as to whether the tax is valid.6
Although in such cases the tax is perhaps logically void, reimbursement should
be required since a benefit has been conferred. 7 Policy considerations favor-
ing the protection of the tax title strongly support this view.8
In the instant case the property of the plaintiff was exempt from tax-
ation by the county, but was subject to taxation by the state. The assessment
by the county was therefore void.9 The court held that reimbursement was
required since the proceeds of the tax, whether assessed by state or county,
would be distributed in the same proportion to the same governmental units
and the only variance might be the amount assessed. 10 The case was distin-
guished from those in which the land was not subject to taxation at all and
those in which the taxes bad been paid, because here the property was sub-
ject to taxation although by different authority. The court preferred to treat
this situation as analogous to those cases requiring reimbursement where the
difficulty is only an irregularity in the assessment.
It is pointed out in the dissent that the original title holder may be
required to reimburse the purchaser for a sum that will never be properly
levied against his property. But as the tax title holder can neither join the
county as a party nor sue the county to recover taxes paid by mistake," some
provision for reimbursing him should be made in such cases, if it may be made
without prejudice to the plaintiff. The court offers as a solution that if there
was any likelihood that assessment by the state might be less than the amount
paid, then the trial court might "exact from defendants assurance that the
defendants would repay to the plaintiffs the difference." 12 By such a pro-
6. The general rule is said to be that a tax is void if the assessment is void. In
some cases the assessment has been declared void for slight irregularities. State Finance
Co. v. Myers, 16 N.D. 193, 112 N.W. 76 (1907); Eaton v. Bennett, 10 N.D. 346, 87
N.W. 188 (1901); Title Trust Co. v. Aylsworth, 40 Ore. 20, 66 Pac. 276 (1901).
But cf. Squires v. Estey, 33 Cal. App. 287, 165 Pac. 34 (1871) (reimbursement will
not be refused for a mere irregularity in the assessment). That assessment by improper
authority voids the tax see, Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Kootenai County, 33 Idaho
234, 192 Pac. 562 (1920).
7. Even though the tax is void, a set-off of the taxes paid may be allowed when
a later proper assessment has been made.
8. "If it were understood that a purchaser at a sale of lands for delinquent taxes
is a mere volunteer, and not entitled to the protection of equitable principles in case
of the invalidity of the sale because of some mere irregularity attending it, there
would probably be few purchasers, and, as a result, the machinery of the state for
securing its revenue would be seriously crippled." Whitehead v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 98 Fed. 10, 13 (8th Cir. 1899). See Notes, The Current Status of Tax
Titles: Remedial Legislation v. Due Process, 62 HARV. L. REV. 93 (1948), How
Secure Is Your Tax Foreclosure Title? 23 WAsH. L. R~v. 132 (1948).
9. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Kootenai County, 33 Idaho 234, 192 Pac. 562 (1920).
10. 209 P.2d at 742.
11. In the absence of statutory authority the purchaser at a tax sale may not
recover from the taxing authority. The rule of caveat emptor is said to apply. Restitu-
tion is not available, because the mistake is one of law. See Notes, 77 A.L.R. 824
(1932), 116 A.L.R. 1408 (1938); RESTATEmiENT, RESTITUTION § 45 (1936).
12. 209 P.2d at 744. The provision as presented leaves open the question of the
duty of the defendant in case the tax is never assessed by the state. It should also
be required that if the tax is not assessed by a set date, perhaps the running of the
statute of limitations, the defendant must repay the plaintiff.
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vision the court has assured the plaintiff that the benefit which otherwise is
dubious is certain to accrue.
In the absence of a statute permitting recovery by a tax title claimant
who had paid by mistake,13 the decision of this case is both equitable and
practical. A condition to reimbursement as recommended by this court pre-
vents both a forfeiture by the defendant and unfairness to the plaintiff.
TORTS-MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-COMPROMISE OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDING AS A BAR
Defendant had caused the plaintiff to be arrested for an alleged fraudulent
breach of trust. Plaintiff paid the defendant $415 to have the criminal charge
dismissed, protesting at the time that he was innocent, that he was being "held
up," dnd that he had to be at a nearby airfield the next day to obtain a position.
He subsequently brought this action for malicious prosecution. There was a
jury verdict for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed. Held (2-1), reversed.
Having voluntarily compromised the criminal-case for a substantial sum, the
plaintiff is estopped from contending that defendant instituted the criminal
action without probable cause. Leonard v. George, 178 F.2d 312 (4th Cir,
1949).
It is important that all citizens be encouraged "to seek the protection of
their interests and the interests of the community in the courts without fear
of being themselves subjected to the hazards of litigation." 1 On the other hand,
there is the equally cogent need to afford a remedy to those who have sustained
injury to their reputation, person or property by the improper use of the
criminal processes.2 From a balancing of these social factors there evolved
the action of malicious prosecution, an action which the courts have circum-
scribed with numerous restrictions.
To maintain a malicious prosecution suit it must be proved that the
defendant instituted a criminal proceeding with malice,3 without probable
13. A statute allowing an action for restitution by the defendant against the county
would prevent the necessity of the condition in the instant case. The defendant in such
instance has a remedy and it would therefore be inequitable to require the plaintiff
to shoulder the burden of the unjust enrichment of the state.
1. G=N, JUDGE AND JURY 338 (1930); Harper, Malicious Prosecution, False Im-
prisonment and Defamation, 15 TEXAs L. REv. 157 (1937); cf. Walsh v. Segale, 70 F.2d
698 (2d Cir. 1934) ; Kershmer v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 133 Me. 519, 180 Atl. 322 (1935).
2. CooLEY, TORTS 381 (4th ed. 1932); Note, 22 GEo. L.J. 343 (1934); 16 N.C.L.
Rav. 277 (1938).
3. Commencing a legal proceeding against another for any purpose other than to
bring an offender to justice is generally considered malicious; hatred, spite or ill will
need not be shown. Griswold v. Horne, 19 Ariz. 56, 165 Pac. 318 (1917); Foltz v.
Buck, 89 Kan. 381, 131 Pac. 587 (1913) ; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Miller, 114 Ky.
954, 71 S.W. 921 (1903) ; Downing v. Stone, 152 N.C. 525, 68 S.E. 9 (1910).
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cause,4 and that it terminated in favor of the plaintiff.5 A judicial determina-
tion of the accused's innocence is not necessary; all that is required is the
absence of a judicial detennination of his guilt.6 By the overwhelming weight
of authority, where the prior proceeding was ended by a compromise or settle-
ment, voluntarily and understandingly consummated by the accused, there
is not such a favorable termination as will support the action.7 But if the
accused was under duress or coercion in entering a compromise, the action
will lie.8 Many of the courts take the position that a compromise is tantamount
to an admission of probable cause. 9 The more realistic explanation would seem
to be that the accused consented to the termination and cannot later take
advantage of it, since, but for the settlement, the accuser would probably have
continued the prosecution. 10
The court in the principal case stated that the "validity" of the compro-
mise was immaterial." This is not entirely accurate. A valid compromise is one
to which the accused consented freely and voluntarily, and any payment of
money or property was understandingly made for the purpose of satisfying
a conceded indebtedness. 12 The maxim in pari dclicto potior est conditio
defendentis has not been applied in tort actions to the same extent as where
restitution is sought."3 If payment was made to the accuser in order to thwart
4. E.g., Brodrib v. Doberstein, 107 Conn. 294, 140 Ati. 483 (1928) ; Jordon v. James &
H. Piano Co., 140 Md. 207, 117 Atl. 366 (1922); Torsch v. Dell, 88 Md. 459, 41 Atl.
903 (1898) (such reasonable grounds to suspect the accused as would warrant a
cautious man in believing him guilty); Rankin v. Crane, 104 Mich. 6, 61 N.W. 1007
(1895) ; McCoy v. Kalbach, 242 Pa. 123, 88 AtI. 879 (1913) ; Munger v. Cox, 146 Va.
574, 131 S.E. 841 (1926) (probable cause, a mixed question of law and fact).
5. E.g., Snead v. Jones, 169 Ala. 143, 53 So. 188 (1910) ; Wilson v. Lapham, 196 Iowa
745, 195 N.W. 235 (1923) ; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Bryant, 105 Va. 403, 54 S.E. 320 (1906);
Note, 26 GEo. L.J. 165 (1937).
6. See Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 114 P.2d 335, 135 A.L.R. 775 (1941) ; See v.
Gosselin, 133 Conn. 158, 48 A.2d 560 (1946); SALO NTD, ToRTs 626 (10th ed., Stallybrass,
1945).
7. Woodson v. McLaughlin, 153 Ark. 151, 239 S.W. 735 (1922); Eustace v.
Dechter, 53 Cal. App. 2d 726, 128 P.2d 367 (1942); Bell Lumber Co. v. Graham, 74
Colo. 149, 219 Pac. 777 (1923) ; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Ill. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668, 112
A.L.R. 325 (1937); Davis v. Brady, 218 Ky. 384, 291 S.W. 412 (1927); Friedman v.
Goffstein, 182 Minn. 396, 234 N.W. 596 (1931); Jones v. Donald Co., 137 Miss. 602,
102 So. 540 (1925); Zebrowski v. Bobinski, 278 N.Y. 332, 16 N.E.2d 355 (1938);
Bristol v. Eckhardt, 254 Wis. 297, 36 N.W.2d 56 (1949); Note, 3 Aax. L. REv. 445
(1949).
8. Smith v. Markensohn, 29 R.I. 55, 69 At. 311 (1908) (accused paid under protest
to secure freedom); Lyons v. Davy-Pocahontas Coal Co., 75 W.Va. 739, 84 S.E. 744
(1915) (agreement not to sue accuser if prosecution dismissed will not bar a malicious
prosecution suit).
9. Nelson v. National Casualty Co., 179 Minn. 53, 228 N.W. 437, 67 A.L.R. 509
(1929); Saner v. Bowker, 69 Mont. 463, 222 Pac. 1056 (1924); PROSSER, Toars 869
(1941).
10. "Although the accused by his acceptance of a compromise does not admit his
guilt, the fact of compromise indicates that the question of his guilt or innocence is left
open. Having bought peace the accused may not thereafter assert that the proceedings
have terminated in his favor." RESTATEEIT q, TORTS § 660, comment c (1938); PRossEIR,
Toars 869 (1941).
11. 178 -. 2d at 314.
12. White v. International Text-Book Co., 156 Iowa 210, 136 N.W. 121 (1912).
13. Shattuck v. Watson, 53 Ark. 147, 13 S.W. 516 (1890) ; Haynes v. Rudd, 102
N.Y. 372, 7 N.E. 287 (1886); Owens v. Owens, 21 Tenn. App. 104, 106 S.W.2d 227
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a criminal prosecution, the cases are not clear whether the illegality of the
compromise will bar a suit in malicious prosecution. However, where the
facts show that the accused was under duress at the time of the tainted
compromise, the courts sometimes hold that a remedial action in the nature of
restitution or quasi-contract is not lost.14 To hold otherwise would tend to
clothe with immunity those who utilize the criminal processes to force pay-
ment of either real or illusory debts, and successfully compromise. 15 Moreover,
in cases not involving a compromise, if the motive of the accuser in resorting
to the criminal courts was to collect a debt, enforce a claim, or recover property,
a majority of the jurisdictions hold that the jury may properly find a want
of probable cause from which it may likewise infer malice. 16
The court in the instant case held that there was insufficient evidence of
duress,' 7 and that reasonable minds could not differ as to the compromise or
settlement of the prior criminal proceeding, so that the trial court should have
directed a verdict for the defendant.' s The existence and the validity of a
compromise is usually considered a question of fact for the jury. 9 In view of
the exigencies of the plaintiff's situation in the instant case, the court rigidly
limited the generally recognized scope of duress. 20 'Many courts under these
facts would probably have upheld a jury finding of duress. It seems not un-
likely that the court's personal opinion concerning the plaintiff's guilt of the
prior criminal charge influenced its decision.21
(M.S. 1937); Wade, Restitution of Benefits Acquired Through Illegal Transactions,
95 U. OF PA. L. REV. 261 (1947).
14. New York Ins. Co. v. Talley, 72 F.2d 715 (8th Cir. 1934); May v. Draper,
220 Ala. 214, 124 So. 89 (1929); Birney v. Birney, 217 Cal. 353, 18 P.2d 672 (1933);
Barton v. McMillian, 52 Fla. 469, 42 So. 849 (1906); Adrico Realty Corp. v. City of
N.Y., 250 N.Y. 29, 164 N.E. 732, 64 A.L.R. 1 (1928) ; Wade, Benefits Obtained Under
Illegal Transactions, 25 TEXAs L. Rav. 31 (1946).
15. White v. International Text-Book Co., 156 Iowa 210, 136 N.W. 121 (1912);
Scovera v. Armbruster, 257 Mich. 340, 241 N.W. 231 (1932).
16. Pritchett v. Northwestern Mutual Ins. Co., 228 Mo. App. 661, 73 S.W.2d 815
(1934); Ross v. Langworthy, 13 Neb. 492, 14 N.W. 515 (1882); Curley v. Automobile
Finance Co., 343 Pa. 280, 23 A.2d 48, 139 A.L.R. 1082 (1941); Graham v. Fidelity
Mutual Life Ass'n, 98 Tenn. 48, 37 S.W. 995 (1896); Morgan v. Duffy, 94 Tenn. 686,
30 S.W. 735 (1895).
17. 178 F.2d at 313. That the courts should recognize "economic duress" in those
tort actions where consent is material, see Dawson, Econonic Duress-An Essay in
Perspective, 45 MicH. L. Rav. 253, 289 (1947).
18. 178 F.2d at 315.
19. Fadner v. Filer, 27 Ill. App. 506 (1888); Lamprey v. H. P. Hood & Sons,
73 N.H. 384, 62 At. 380 (1905) ; Robbins v. Robbins, 133 N.Y. 597, 30 N.E. 977 (1892);
Jennings v. Clearwater Mfg. Co., 171 S.C. 498, 172 S.E. 870 (1934).
20. "[T]he gravamen [of duress] is a coercion of the will by physical or mental
restraint, so that the victim does not act as a free moral agent in respect to the matter at
stake." Cox v. Edwards, 120 Minn. 512, 139 N.W. 1070, 1072 (1913). The will is con-
strained when unlawful compulsion requires a choice between comparative evils. Harris
v. Cary, 122 Va. 362, 71 S.E. 551 (1911); Bratberg v. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co.,
61 N.D. 452, 238 N.W. 552 (1931); Williamson-Halsell, Frazier Co. v. Ackerman,
77 Kan. 502, 94 Pac. 807 (1908) (duress is tested by state of mind of victim, not by the
nature of acts or threats); Dalzell, Duress by Economic Pressure, 20 N.C.L. REv. 341,
366 (1942).
21. See PaossaR, ToRTs 869 (1941); Wade, Legal Status of Property Transferred
Under an Illegal Transaction, 41 ILL. L. REV. 487, 506 (1946).
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WILLS-HOLOGRAPHIC WILLS-INTEGRATION AND DATING
REQUIREMENTS
At decedent's request three witnesses affixed their signatures to an
envelope which contained three papers written in decedent's handwriting.
Decedent was unable to speak but nodded affirmatively when asked if the
envelope contained her will. The first of the three pages was dated and
signed, and was by itself a valid testamentary instrument in that it named
executors and provided for the payment of debts. The only further refer-
ence to the disposition of property was the statement, "The following bequests
are to be given my friends herein named." The other two sheets, written
nine years after first, contained a list of bequests which filled the second
and was continued and completed on the third where decedent's signature
again appeared. Neither of the latter pages was dated. All three sheets
were folded together but there was no mechanical attachment. The three
sheets were admitted to probate as a valid will, and contestants appealed.
Held, affirmed. Testatrix adopted the date of the first page by her signature
on the last and thus satisfied the dating requirement. In re Dumas' Estate,
210 P.2d 697 (Cal. 1949).
Two questions which commonly arise in connection with holographic
wills are presented by the facts of this case. The first is the validity of
execution where the expressed date is not factually correct because of altera-
tions or additions made after the date of the original execution. In states
which require by statute that holographic wills be dated, the courts have
been strict in requiring that there be a legible date,1 entirely in the testator's
handwriting,2 but have been less insistent that the date be correct.3 It would
appear that they are attempting to balance the necessity of compliance with
the statute with the prevailing policy against involuntary intestacy.4 Once
it is decided that a date is a mere formal requirement satisfied by the appear-
ance of any date, it is but a short step to the proposition that the writing
as altered by interlineations and modifications made by the" testator in his
own writing is valid, because, by'virtue of his adopting the date and signature
1. Succession of Beird, 145 La. 756, 82 So. 881, 6 A.L.R. 1452 (1919) (date "9-8-18"
-not possible to tell whether September 8 or August 9 intended) ; Heffner v. Heffner,
48 La. Ann. 1088, 20 So. 281 (1896) (designation of month and year only held insufficient
as date); Montague v. Street, 59 N.D. 618, 231 N.W. 728 (1930) (same) ; In re Love's
Estate, 75 Utah 342, 285 Pac. 299 (1930) (year only insufficient); see Succession of
Curtis, 149 La. 487, 89 So. 629, 630 (1921) (last digit of year not clear). But cf. In re
Hail's Estate, 106 Okla. 124, 235 Pac. 916 (1923).
2. It re Plumel's Estate, 151 Cal. 77, 90 Pac. 192, 121 Am. St. Rep. 100 (1907) (use
of printed "190-" as part of date not valid) ; In re Noyes' Estate, 40 Mont. 190, 105 Pac.
1017, 26 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1145, 20 Ann. Cas. 366 (1909) (same).
3. In re Clisby's Estate, 145 Cal. 407, 78 Pac. 964 (1904); In re Fay, 145 Cal. 82,
78 Pac. 340, 104 Am. St. Rep. 17 (1904) (30-year error).
4. In re Hail's Estate, 106 Okla. 124, 235 Pac. 916 (1923); Cowherd v. Fleming, 84
W. Va. 227, 100 S.E. 84 (1919).
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already appearing, it still fulfills the dating and signing requirements.5 The
use of substitute pages is a type of alteration but one which presents the
the second problem involved in the instant case-that of integration.
Wills may be written on more than one page if there is satisfactory
evidence that the several papers offered for probate were intended by dece-
dent to operate as a single document. Mechanical attachment,6 internal
coherence and adaptation, 7 and interreference between pages 8 strongly tend
to prove integration,, but they are not indispensable and courts have not
hesitated to uphold wills where none of those circumstances existed. 9 Thus
the court in the present case considered evidence of the sheets having been
folded together and enclosed in an envelope, and of the nodded affirmation
of testatrix herself that the papers in the envelope were her will, as warrant-
ing a finding that those papers were intended to operate as a single testa-
mentary document.
The modem trend in states where holographic wills are recognized
has been to be less insistent on formalities because that insistence would be
detrimental to the policy favoring testamentary disposition of property.10
It appears that the court in the instant case has reflected this attitude in
upholding the will.
5. The original date and signature are a part of the altered document just as are
all of the other words not erased or cancelled. In re Finkler's Estate, 3 Cal. 2d 584, 46
P.2d 149 (1935) ; Stanley v. Henderson, 139 Tex. 166, 162 S.W.2d 95 (1942) ; Triplett's
Ex'r v. Triplett, 161 Va. 906, 172 S.E. 162 (1934) ; LaRue v. Lee, 63 W. Va. 388, 60
S.E. 388, 14 L.R.A. (N.s.) 968, 12 Am. St. Rep. 978 (1908).
6. Succession of Drysdale, 124 La. 256, 50 So. 30 (1909).
7. In re Johnston's Estate, 64"Cal. App. 197, 221 Pac. 382 (1923).
8. Ip re Miller's Estate, 128 Cal. App. 176, 17 P.2d 181 (1932) ; Hays v. Marschall,
243 Ky. 392, 48 S.W.2d 540 (1932).
9. Merryfield v. Fox, 167 Cal. 729, 141 Pac. 259 (1914) ; It re Swendsen's Estate,
43 Cal. App. 2d 551, 111 P.2d 408 (1941); Cole v. Webb, 220 Ky. 817, 295 S.W. 1035
(1927) ; Appeal of Sleeper, 129 Me. 194, 151 Atl. 150, 71 A.L.R. 518 (1930) ; Alexander
v. Johnston, 171 N.C. 468, 88 S.E. 785 (1916).
10. CAL. PROD. CODE A N. § 53 (1944) ; It re Parsons' Will, 207 N.C. 584, 178 S.E,
78 (1935). "[Tlhe safeguards of our statute of wills are designed to prevent forgery and
imposition; they are not designed to make the execution of wills a mere trap and pit-
fall, and their probate a mere game." Bell v. Timmius, 58 S.E.2d 55, 59 (Va. 1950);
Mechem, The Integration of Holographic Wills, 12 N.C.L. REv. 213, 221 (1934).
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